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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Driver's Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO

OPINION
and

and

AWARD
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
ori behalf of Marby Garage

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Bernard Plotsker? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 9, 1975 at which time
Mr. Plotsker, hereinafter referred to as the grievant, and
representatives of the above named parties appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The grievant was discharged for "low bookings."
In this case I accept as accurate the Employer's
testimony supported by a written statement from his accountant, that his "break-even point" for each car in his fleet
(i.e. the point at which reasonable operating expenses are
met and below which it loses money) was 41.787 cents per
mile for the ten month period January 1 through October 31,
1974.

In this case I deem that break-even point to be

reasonable.

Additionally in this case, I deem cents booked

per mile as a reasonable and relevant measurement of whether
bookings are low or adequate, and that the ten month period

-2was enough time within which to make a valid determination.
The record shows that during that period the grievant
was not only consistently the lowest hooker in the garage,
based on the cents per mile standard, but that his bookings fell well below that break-even point, averaging about
35 to 37 cents per mile.

(A level which a principal Union

official conceded was unreasonable.)
I am satisfied therefore that the grievant's record
is one of "low bookings" within the definition I previously
enunciated and promulgated, and in this case the Employer
has met the burden of showing "low bookings" within that
definition.
It should be clear that this decision is applicable
only to this particular case.

In future "low bookings" cases

I intend to decide the probative value of the evidence, the
manner, quantity and quality of proof required, and standards
to be applied on a case by case basis.
I have previously held that an employee may be
disciplined for low bookings in accordance with the "progressive
discipline" formula.

I am satisfied that the purpose and

intent of that formula was adequately complied with by the
Employer in the instant case.

Several times the grievant

was warned orally and in writing about low productivity.
Though not precisely suspended prior to the instant

discharge,

the purpose and import of a suspension was achieved by the

-3two previous times he was discharged, which, on the Union's
intervention were revoked not simply because they were
procedurally premature but rather "to give the grievant
a final chance."

The evidence that the Employer agreed

to revoke those earlier discharges for that reason, is
unrefuted.

Consequently, as the purpose of a suspension

is to impress upon an employee the unacceptable nature of
his work and to put him on notice that unless improved, his
job is in jeopardy, those two attempts by the Employer to
discharge the grievant, revoked on the grounds mentioned,
served that purpose.

And I am satisfied that the grievant

knew or should have known of that purpose.

Accordingly I

deem those two revoked discharges, under their particular
circumstances, to be constructively equivalent to a suspension
within the progressive discipline formula.

Hence, when thereafter the grievant's productivity
record remained below the "break-even point," his discharge
was warranted, and that action is accordingly upheld.
The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties makes the following AWARD:

-4-

There was just cause for the discharge
of Bernard Plotsker.

Eric J. Schmertz

DATED: January 21, 1975
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty first day of January, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

DONALD F. MENAGH, P.C.
ATTORNEY
13D

EAST

AT

4OTH

LAW
STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y. 1 O Q 1 6
(212)

532-3850

January 17, 1975
Eric J. Schmertz, P.C.
122 East 42nd Street
New York, N. Y. 10017
Dear Mr. Schmertz:
In recent arbitrations, various Employers
have produced letters from their accountants which
recite a "break-even point" as probative of alleged
"low bookings-high mileage".
On behalf of the Union, I object to the
practice on at least two grounds:
First, whatever has gone into the computation of the break-even point will forever remain a
mystery unless both the accountant and supporting
business records are produced.
Second, and of utmost importance, the Employers have conceded that the actual salaries of
owners and managers are a factor in determining the
"break-even point". These salaries represent profits.
Indeed, there may be no other declared profits whatsoever. The "break-even point" is therefore equivalent
to the Employers stating that, regardless of the salaries-profits that they command, they cannot "break
even" unless a certain figure is attained.
This permits the Employer to set any profit
margin he wishes and to discharge any driver whose
bookings cannot support that margin.
This result would undermine the awards of
the Impartial Chairman which awards have sought to establish a fair standard of productivity.

Very truly yours,
dy^~^t^C' /". >v-t^~~*~< JLs
Donald F.
DFM/er
CC: Maurice H. Goetz, Esq.
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXI CAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO

AWARD

and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade ,
Inc. on behalf of Columbia Operating
Co . , Inc .
-X

The undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above-named
parties makes the following findings and Award:
At a hearing held on December 30, 197^-, initiated by
Columbia Operating Co., Inc., said Employer sought a directive from the Impartial Chairman recognizing Its right to
impose certain work rules at its garage.
I find that Columbia Operating Co., Inc. has the
right, pursuant to Article III of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, to establish reasonable work rules at the garage.
I further find that Columbia has the right to post a notice
in its garage establishing 7:30 A.M. as the time beyond
which it will no longer hold a taxi for a steady driver and
that cabs otherwise driven by steady drivers may be dispatched to others after said time.

I further find that Columbia

Operating Co., Inc. may establish a time of 4:30 P.M. as the
return time for all taxis dispatched during the morning
shift.

I hereby direct that any interference with the
implementation of these work rules shall be cause for the
imposition of discipline upon any employee who instigates,
participates in, or gives leadership to any such interference.

Epic J. Schmertz
xonpartial Chairman
Dated:

January

1975.

STATE OF NEW YORK
)
COUNTY OF NEW-YORK ) SS. :
Kick's <>
On this --* day of January, 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me as the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

Notary Public
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Driver's Union Local
3036, AFL-CIO on Behalf of John Gordon,
Stephen Mantin, David Tobis, Paul
Wasserman and Thomas Robbins

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc
on Behalf of Dover Garage, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Is there just cause for disciplinary
action against John Gordon, Stephen
Mantin, David Tobis, Thomas Robbins
and Paul Wasserman? If so what shall
it be?
Hearings were held on December 27, 1974 and January 9,
1975 at which time the above named employees, hereinafter referred to as the "employees" and representatives of the above
named Employer and Union appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and to cross-examine witnesses.

The Union and the Employer,

hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," filed post
hearing briefs.

At the request of the Impartial Chairman,

counsel for the parties agreed to extend the due date for
rendition of the Award until on or before March 14, 1975.

The Employer seeks the right to discharge Messrs. Robbins,
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Gordon, and Tobis, and to impose a three week suspension on
both Wasserman and Mantin.

The Employer charges that the em-

ployees violated Article XXVI

Industrial Peace of the collect-

ive bargaining agreement by engaging in a work stoppage within
the meaning and prohibition of that contract section.
Article XXVI

provides in pertinent part:

During the term of this contract, the Union,
its officers, representatives, agents, and
members agree that they shall not authorize,
instigate, cause, aid, encourage, support,
condone or participate in any strike, slowdown, work stoppage, boycott or picketing or
patrolling directed against, or any curtailment of work, or restriction of, or interference with, the operations of the employer
or any of its affiliated companies.
The Employer shall have the unrestricted right
to discipline, up to and including discharge,
any employee who instigates, participates in,
or gives leadership to any activity herein
prohibited.
The foregoing contract provisions have been the subject
of numerous decisions by this Impartial Chairman.

In my decision

of May 28, 1974 In the Matter of the Arbitration between New York
City Taxi Driver's Union, Local 3036, AFL-CIO and Metropolitan
Board of Trade, Inc., on behalf of Dover Garage, Inc. (the same
parties as in the instant case) the issue before me was whether
there was reasonable cause for the discharge of Thomas Robbins,
one of the employees herein.

I decided that Robbins1 actions

were justified because he had been provoked by the Employer's

-3dispatcher and that therefore cause did not exist for his discharge.

However I stated:
He (Robbins) is reminded that there are
no circumstances which justify the utilization
of self-help to redress a grievance. All complaints against the Company are to be processed
as grievances and submitted to arbitration in
accordance with the contract. No other remedy
is permitted. The arbitration forum is fully
capable of redressing all grievances and making
employees whole for any Employer breach of the
contract. Consequently, as I have repeatedly
held and stated, strikes, slowdowns and other
interruptions of the Company's normal operations
are impermissible methods of handling a grievance
and constitute dischargeable offenses....In the
future any complaints that he (Robbins) may have
against the Company and any allegations that the
Company has not followed the contract must be
handled in only one way - as a grievance under
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.
In my award of June 17, 1974 between the same parties,

again involving the question of whether reasonable cause existed for the discharge of Tom Robbins I withheld decision on
whether Robbins "instigated or encouraged a work stoppage" and
reserved the rights of the parties on that question pending
future developments.

I stated explicitly, pursuant to the

stipulation of the parties withdrawing that arbitration:
It is agreed that the utilization of selfhelp in the form of a work stoppage to redress
a grievance is not justified and that all such
grievances should be submitted to arbitration in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. It is further agreed that no other remedy
is permitted and that the arbitration forum is
fully capable of redressing any and all grievances.
It is acknowledged that the work stoppage
that occurred at Dover Garage on May 14, 1974

-4is an impermissible method of handling a
grievance. If Tom Robbins instigated or
encouraged such work stoppage, Dover Garage
would be justified in imposing a disciplinary
penalty up to and including discharge, subject
to review under the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract....
In the future, if Mr. Robbins commits any
violation of any work rule at Dover Garage, the
question of penalty may be considered in light
of his entire work record....
In numerous other Awards between the Union and other
employers, in industry-wide awards, and in formal and informal
conferences, and rulings an directives of the Impartial Chairman,
the impermissibility of work stoppages in any form was reiterated repeatedly and explicitly.

Again and again the Impartial

Chairman stated in decisions, directives, and meetings that the
Industrial Peace section of the contract must be complied with
by the Union, its designated representatives and its members,
and that no matter what the underlying grievance might be, the
exclusive procedure for its redress and ajudication was the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.

There is

absolutely no doubt in my mind that all employees in this
industry, industry-wide, and their agents have been put on
actual notice time and again that breaches of the "no strike"
clause of the contract would not be tolerated and that utilization of self-help in the form of a work stoppage or any disruption of the Employer's normal operation as a means to achieve
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resolution of a grievance is expressly prohibited; and that as
an alternative, the arbitration forum was both available and
fully capable of providing an aggrieved employee or employees
a full remedy if the grievance is meritorious.

It cannot be

disputed that the instant employees have been put on such notice
Moreover as the parties well know, and as has been made
clear repeatedly to employees generally, and to the employees
herein explicitly on at least two prior occasions, the
Impartial Chairman has been ready to convene emergency arbitration hearings on the very day that a grievance arises, and to
render a decision forthwith after the hearing, if the grievance
is so compelling and has such immediacy as to warrant expedited
attention.
Based on all the foregoing I find no justification whatsoever for the action which the employees took and which led to
the instant case.

I find that the employees, led by Thomas

Robbins, acted in willful violation of the Industrial Peace
section of the contract and in willful disregard and defiance
of the foregoing Awards of the Impartial Chairman.
Under the fictitious guise of a "safety check" the
employees, led by Thomas Robbins, effectively stopped the
dispatching of cabs by the Employer during the dispatching
period; persuaded drivers not to take out their cabs; held a
shop meeting during that critical period; removed the ignition

-6key from the lead cab on the gas line to prevent the gassing
and dispatching; and that in actuality this action was a work
stoppage in retaliation for the Employer's failure to settle
a different grievance, totally unrelated to safety, to the
immediate satisfaction of Robbins and the other employees.
Robbins and the other employees are members of the
Union's "shop committee" at this Employer.

A dispute arose

over a reward in the form of a check, which a passenger sent
in for one of the drivers who retrieved and returned a piece
of personal property left by the passenger in that driver's
taxicab.

In some inexplicable manner the check - was deposited

by the Employer in his general account and neither it nor its
equivalent in money, was given to the driver for which it was
intended.

The employees, led by Robbins, demanded an explana-

tion from representatives of the Employer and a forthwith
resolution of that dispute.

They demanded that the dispatcher,

whom they accused of improprieties in connection with the check,
be confronted immediately with their demand.
asked for time to investigate

When the Employer

the situation, the employees led

by Robbins decided to pull a "safety check" on the cabs as they
came in at shift time.

A shop meeting was called at a time to

coincide with the dispatching period.
twenty minutes

It lasted for

at least

during which time the normal dispatching of

cabs, in normal quantities, was significantly delayed and
disrupted.

I find that the shop meeting and the safety check

-7would have continued for a good deal longer, thereby disrupting
the Employer's normal operations further, had not the rank and
file drivers voted to discontinue the shop meeting and the safety
check and reverse the action of the employees led by Robbins.
In contravention of the explicit provisions of the foregoing Awards of the Impartial Chairman and his procedure to
hold emergency arbitrations when the situation warranted that
attention, the employees, led by Robbins, did not grieve the
dispute over the reward due one of the drivers nor did they
seek immediate arbitration of that issue, despite the requirement
under the aforegoing awards that they follow that orderly
procedure, and despite the obvious fact that the arbitration
forum could have fully and readily remedied the problem by
directing payment of the reward to the driver who apparently was
entitled to it.

Precipitious and unlawful action in the form of

a concerted and "shot-gun" safety check, designed not to find
safety problems with the cabs, but to demonstrate and impose on
the Employer the power of the employees, led by Robbins, to
shut-down the dispatching operation as punishment for failure
to settle the grievance as quickly and in the manner which
Robbins and the other employees demanded.
I need not decide whether a "safety check" is an appro-"!
priate action by the shop committee, because I am fully satisfied
that this was not a bona fide safety check.

I take a dim view

of the right of a shop committee to unilaterally halt the
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dispatching of cabs to check the condition of those cabs without
the agreement, or acquiesence of the Employer and without some
contractual basis for doing so.

The type of action involved

herein, because of the time it occurred, its application to a
vast number of cabs, the manner in which the lead cab on the gas
line at least was disabled so that others could not move, together with the shop meeting was a per se disruption and interruption of the Employer's normal operations within the proscription set forth in the Industrial Peace clause of the contract.
This is not to say that the employees do not have a right to
complain about unsafe cabs.

There are methods which they may

follow to protest an unsafe

condition of a particular cab,

which is not disruptive of the Employer's normal operations, and
which is not conducted on such a mass scale, during dispatching
time, as to be beyond what is permissible in such a situation.
Indeed under the newly negotiated contract the parties have
provided for just such a procedure which points up sharply the
difference between a bona fide and orderly check on the safety
of a cab, and the impermissible action and improper intent of
the employees, led by Robbins, in the instant case.
The contention of the employees that their action is
"protected" under the National Labor Relations Act is totally
untenable.

It is universally accepted and universally settled

that Union representatives including members of shop committees
have a higher duty to uphold the integrity of the collective

-9bargaining agreement, and all provisions thereof, especially the
grievance and arbitration sections and the no strike clause.
For members of the shop committee to engage in a work stoppage,
whether under the guise of a concerted "safety check" or otherwise, is to subvert the stability of the contract and the orderly
procedures which the Union and the Employer have agreed upon to
resolve all disputes.

And it is equally well settled that for

just that reason, employees who hold union positions, and who
engage in such proscribed activities are subject to more severe
disciplinary penalties than are ordinary rank and file members.
Indeed in the course of the hearing the Impartial Chairman asked
Mr. Robbins why he did not grieve and ask for immediate arbitration of the dispute involving the reward check due one of the
drivers.

Robbins responded "Ithought of doing that but decided

not to."

Obviously then, he knew the procedure which he was to

follow but willfully and knowlingly rejected it.

By doing so

he defaulted on the higher duty which he owed to the Employer,
to the Union and to the letter and spirit of the contract.
It should be clear therefore that this Employer, in
seeking the right to impose on the employees the disciplinary
penalties he requests, does not do so to discriminate against
them for Union activity.

That each of them is a member of the

Union shop committee does not give them protection when they
act in violation of the contract and in violation of the prior
Awards of the Impartial Chairman.

They cannot, as a defense
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to their unlawful actions, cloak themselves with an immunity
based on their representative positions with the Union.
The evidence fully demonstrates that each of the employees
actively participated in and assumed some direction of the work
stoppage.

But the principal leader was Robbins.

Based on the

record it is my view that but for Robbins' leadership the socalled "safety check" and shop meeting would not have taken place
no matter how angry the other employees were about the underlying
grievance.

Therefore while each are subject to disciplinary

penalties a distinction is made between Robbins and the others.
For their unlawful action which, stripped to its real
purpose, intent and objective, was nothing more than a willfully
instigated and implemented work stoppage in violation of the
Industrial Peace provisions of the contract and in violation of
the explicit Awards and other directives of the Impartial
Chairman, disciplinary action is warranted and in no respect
whatsoever can it be construed as discrimination against the
employees either for Union activity or because of their role
as representatives of the Union.
Accordingly the Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman in
the contract between the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The Employer may discharge Thomas Robbins.
The Employer may impose a two week disciplinary
suspension on John Gordon, Stephen Mantin, David
Tobis and Paul Wasserman.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

-11DATED:
STATE OF New York )Q Q *
COUNTY OF New York ) ''
On this
day of March, 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICA3 INDUSTRY

-X
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Driver's Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of
Trade, Inc. on Behalf of
55th Street Taxi Garage, Inc.

The stipulated issues are:
What shall be the disposition of the grievance
of David Ross with respect to his alleged improper discharge?
Does the Employer have cause or the right to
impose-disciplinary penalties on those employees who allegedly engaged in an alleged
work stoppage on March 12 and March 13* 1975?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on March 14, 197 5 .> at which time
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
At the outset., I wish to confirm my announced finding
that all grievances relating to working conditions and terms
iof employment at the garage may be raised by the Union and
(heard by the Impartial Chairman at a future date.

No findings

lave been made with respect to such grievances and the rights
of all parties are expressly reserved. Similarly, although
no findings will be made, this Opinion and Award shall not

preclude the right of the Employer to seek in a future
arbitration to recover from the Union the loss of any revenues
occasioned by the alleged work stoppage.
David Ross was discharged on February 28, 1975

by the

:

|Employer following an incident with the cashier.

Although

I

I Mr. Ross was a Union member and had "been employed at Forest
i
;Maintenance prior to his employment with the Employer, a
}
;period of 30 calendar days subsequent to his employment at
: 55th Street Garage had not been completed. Although the
ii
;Union seeks to include the date of March 13, 1975 as a day
i

iworked,
Mr. Ross was permitted to work, under protest, at my
!

i

Direction and such working day shall not accrue to his benefit
As I have determined this issue on the basis of contract
'•language and interpretation it is not necessary to examine
1

;: the events of February 28th or to decide whether or not Just
il
ii cause existed for the discharge of David Ross.
I find that Section 3 of Article XXV Seniority of the
1;

Pcollective bargaining agreement is applicable in the instant
6
|i case and that, notwithstanding an employee's industry-wide
it
j seniority, an employee shall be regarded as probationary for
h

the first 30 calendar days after employment with an employer.
Accordingly, as probationary employees may be discharged
ij for any reason, the discharge of David Ross is upheld.

The Employer has introduced testimony concerning a
work stoppage that occurred at the garage on March 12 and
March 13, 1975-

As I have stated on numerous occasions and

in numerous awards, rulings and directives, the utilization
of self-help in the form of work stoppage to redress any

- 2-

grievance Is not Justified, and the exclusive procedure for
I such redress is the grievance and arbitration provisions of
the contract.

11
j

:;the

Breaches of the Industrial Peace clause of

contract will not be tolerated and any disruption of

'the Employer's normal operations as a means of a resolution
:;of a grievance is expressly prohibited.

i
ij

. I also reiterate my statements of earlier Awards that

:the

Union representatives, including the members of the shop

: committee, have a higher duty to uphold the integrity of the
collective bargaining agreement and all provisions thereof,
especially the grievance and arbitration clause and the
Industrial Peace clause.

It is well settled that employees

who hold Union positions and who engage In proscribed
activities are subject to more severe disciplinary penalties
Jfor their actions in subverting the stability of the contract
:and the orderly procedures which the Union and the Employer
have agreed upon to reserve all disputes.
ii
|

As noted in the collective bargaining agreement and as

.:stated on numerous prior occasions, the Employer has the
!i

.(unrestricted right to discipline, up to and including dis-

jj
'charge, any employee who instigates, participates in, or
i!
Ij

Ogives leadership to a proscribed work stoppage. But for the

|i
'
liunusual circumstances under which this expedited arbitration
iI

Ijwas scheduled, I would uphold the Employer's right to impose
;II

ijsevere disciplinary penalties In this case.
As an Impartial third-party to the settlement of the
work stoppage, I have determined that disciplinary action in
the instant case alone Is not permissible and, accordingly,

— 3 —

I find no right on the part of the Employer to impose
discipline by reason of the incidents in question.
In the future, all complaints against the Employer are

jl
!!

to be processed as grievances in accordance with the contract.

! The arbitration forum has always been fully capable of redressing such grievances and there are no circumstances which
jj

;1 justify the utilization of self-help, whether in the form of
'strikes, slow-downs, stoppages or other interruptions of
; normal operations.

. Schmertz
Chairman'

; Dated:

March

'/

:STATE OF NEW YORK

, 1975

)

|!

: SS.:

;! COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

On this '7 day of March, 1975^ before me personally
: came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz, to me known and known to
;me to be the individual described in and who executed the
iforegoing instrument, and he acknowledged to me that he execuj'ted the same.

''
Notary PubSric
FRANK T. ZOTTO
Notary Public, Stale of New York
Mo. 4 1 - 9 3 1 1430
Qualified in Queens County Commission -Expires March 30, 1976

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
Opinion

and

and

Award
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Dover Garage, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was there reasonable cause for the discharge of
Tom Robbins? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on May 22, 1974, at which time Mr. Robbins,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives
of the above named Union and Employer appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

oath was expressly waived.
I find blame on both sides.

The grievant is to be blamed

for using profane and insulting language to a managerial employee and by using a phrase which could reasonably be interpreted only as a challenge to a fight.

On the other hand I

find that Mr. Isaacson, the managerial employee involved, acted
in a manner which the grievant had reason to interpret as insensitive and provocative.
I find no fault with the Company policy not to accept personal phone calls for its employees at shift time when checks
are being distributed.

The rule is proper in order to prevent

- 2 interference with the Company's operations during that particularly busy period.

However, for reasons indicated further,

the Company's admission that it had not made that policy
known to its employees was, in my judgment, a contributing
factor to the incident between the grievant and Isaacson. Also
it is clear that when the grievant's wife called on May 7th,
Isaacson told her that he could not accept personal calls and
discontinued the conversation before she could identify herself
and tell him of the alleged emergency nature of the call.
Hence at that time Isaacson did not know who was calling or
that she called to tell the grievant their son was lost.
I find no particular fault with the grievant's initial
action four days later (his first working day following the
aforementioned phone call) when he informed Isaacson that the
rejected phone call was an emergency - that his wife was trying to notify him that their son was lost.

There is no evi-

dence that this statement by the grievant to Isaacson w a at
that point intemperate or challenging.

In response however,

by his own testimony, Isaacson replied "we still don't take
personal messages."

Isaacson repeated the phrase "No personal

calls" when the grievant again stated that the call was to inform him that his son was lost.
Considering the fact that the grievant did not know of
the Company's policy not to accept and relay personal phone
calls during shift hours when checks were being handed out,
I consider it understandable and reasonable that the grievant
interpreted what Isaacson said as a callous, indifferent and

- 3 unsympathetic response

to the grievant's personal emergency,

and an absolute prohibition on personal calls even in an emergency.

While the grievant's conduct thereafter cannot be con-

doned, his intemperate, angry and challenging reaction is understandable and not unpredictable.
In short, had the Company made its policy regarding personal phone calls known to its employees, and had Isaacson's
response included an explanation of that policy and some expression of concern and sympathy regarding the grievant's son,
or at least that he did not know of the emergency when the call
came in, I think the incident might not have occurred.

On the

other hand, the grievant's use of foul and insulting language
to Isaacson and his challenging statement to "come outside" was
both improper and unnecessary.

He should have controlled his

anger and complained to the Union and grieved.
I have previously held and stated on numerous occasions
that unprovoked use of insulting, disrespectful and insubordinate language by an employee to supervision is a dischargeable
offense.

And certainly that holds for challenges to fight. How-

ever, here that penalty is mitigated by a degree of provocation,
which whether so intended by Isaacson or not, was, I find, reasonably so interpreted by the grievant.

Suspension, rather than

discharge is the appropriate penalty here.
Accordingly the grievant shall be restored to work with his
seniority intact but without back pay.

He is reminded that there

are no circumstances which justify the utilization of self help
to redress a grievance.

All complaints against the Company are

- 4 to be processed as grievances and submitted to arbitration in
accordance with the contract.

No other remedy is permitted.

The arbitration forum is fully capable of redressing all grievances and making employees whole for any employer breach of
the contract.

Consequently, as I have repeatedly held and stat-

ed, strikes, slowdowns, and other interruptions of the Company's
normal operations are impermissable methods of handling a grievance and constitute dischargeable offenses.
The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties makes the following Award:
The discharge of Tom Robbins is reduced to a suspension. He shall be restored to work forthwith
with his seniority intact but without back- pay.
In the future any complaints that he may have
against the Company and any allegations that the
Company has not followed the contract, must be
handled in only one way - as a grievance under the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: May 28, 1974
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this 28th
and appeared Eric
be the individual
instrument and he

day of May, 1974, before me personally came
J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union,
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
Opinion

and

and
Award

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on Behalf of Circle Maintenance Corp.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Walter
Summers? If not, what shall be the remedy?
On due notice hearings were held, at which Mr. Summers,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
of the Union and Employer appeared. All were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Prior to the alleged offenses which triggered his discharge, the grievant had been orally warned and had received
three written warnings and a six day displinary suspension
for various offenses including

singly and cumulatively,

accidents, failure to complete the safe driving school as directed, a "flag up" violation, high mileage and low bookings,
and bringing in his cab late.
The first question is the legitimacy of those oral and
written warnings and the six day suspension.

It is well

settled that warnings and suspensions must be justified by
the Employer if challenged when they are originally imposed.
However, if unchallenged at or within a reasonable time after
imposition, the warnings and suspensions are presumed justified.

- 2 Thereafter, if questioned in a later proceeding involving, as here, an employee's discharge for subsequent offenses together with that prior record, the burden is on the
challenging party to refute that presumption.
case that presumption has not been refutted,

In the instant
Consequently

the oral and written warnings and the six day suspension must
be deemed factual and valid.
The issue then is whether the grievant is guilty of all
or any of the subsequent offenses which, together with his
prior record warrants the penalty of discharge.
Based on the record before me I conclude that discharge
was proper.

He is charged with five subsequent offenses, name-

ly late return of his cab, failure to call an attorney regarding an accident when instructed to do so, use of profane, contemptuous and disrespectful language to the day-line dispatcher, additional incidents of excessive mileage and low bookings following a meeting on that subject with the Union, and
a failure to correct that "bad mileage ratio" following the
six day suspension.
I find that I need not analyze the evidence on all five
of these accusations because the grievant's conduct in connection with the third item, namely, his insubordinate and abusive
use of profane and obscene language to the day line dispatcher, constitutes against the backdrop of this prior record, a
dismissable offense.
I do not accept the assertion that the grievant's language was merely "joking" or ordinary "shop talk."

Rather I

- 3 am persuaded that he directed invective at and to the dispatcher personally, and used obscene phrases in a grossly insubordinate, disrespectful and challenging manner.
did so in the presence of others.

And he

I recognize that this is

a taxi garage and that the language used in conversation and
business dealings between employees and representatives of
management may well include earthy words and phrases.
the facts here were different.

But

The grievant used obscene

phrases to insult the dispatcher, and to degrade him in the
eyes of others, and I do not find that the dispatcher provoked
the grievant into doing so.
Arbitration cases uniformly hold that this type of insubordinate abuse of a management representative by an employee is grounds for summary dismissal irrespective of the employee's prior record.

And where, as here, a prior record

includes a series of warnings and a six day suspension over a
relatively short three year period of employment, the principle
of "progressive discipline" has been met and the propriety pf
termination is manifest.

This is not to say that the other

four reasons pointed to by the Employer as grounds for the
grievant's discharge have been either proved or disproved.
Rather only that a determination of those charges is not necessary in reaching a

decision on the propriety of the griev-

ant 's dismissal.
Accordingly, the Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of

- 4 the parties, makes the following Award;
There was just cause for the discharge of
Walter Summers.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATE: March 27, 1974
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 27th day of March, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Locals 2222,
2320-27, AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case No. 1130-0903-72

and
New England Telephone Company

The Undersigned Arbitrators, duly designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement between the above
named parties dated September 26, 1971, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of said parties make the following
AWARD:

The fourteen hour suspensions on November
13, 1972 of Francis McFawn, Jr. and Howard
Franklin were not in violation of Article 9
of the current collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

James J. McDevitt
Concurring
Dissenting

Vincent J. Luca, Sr,
Dissenting
Concurring

-2-

DATED: September 18, 1975
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )S
On this eighteenth day of October,j 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of October, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared James J. McDevitt to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of October, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Vincent J. Luca, Sr. to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Locals 2222,
2320-27, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF THE CHAIRMAN
Case No. 1130-0903-72

and
New England Telephone Company

In accordance with Article 9 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated September 26, 1971 between IBEW Locals 2222,
2320-27, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union" and New
England Telephone Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company",
the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman of a tri-partite
Board of Arbitration, to hear and decide, together with the Union
and Company designees to said Board, the following stipulated
issues:
1.

Was the suspension of Francis McFawn, Jr.
for 14 hours, November 13, 1972, in violation of Article 9 of the current collective
bargaining agreement? If so, what should be
the remedy, if any?

2.

Was the suspension of Howard Franklin for
14 hours, November 13, 1972, in violation
of Article 9 of the current collective
bargaining agreement? If so, what should
be the remedy, if any?

The relevant section of Article 9 (specifically 9.03(a)
reads:
If the grievance involves a discharge or
disciplinary action, the Board of Arbitration
shall determine whether the discharge or
disciplinary action was for just cause. If
the Board of Arbitration finds that the discharge
or disciplinary action was without just cause,
the employee shall be reinstated and may receive
his straight time rate of pay for time lost, less
any amount other than wages, received from the
Company at time of dismissal.

-2A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts

on May 19, 1975

at which time Messrs. McFawn and Franklin hereinafter referred to
as the "grievants", and representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Messrs. Vincent J. Luca, Sr. and James J. McDevitt served respectively as the Union and Company Arbitrators on the Board of
Arbitration.

The Oath of the Arbitrators was expressly waived.

The parties filed post-hearings briefs.

The Arbitration Board

met in Executive Session in New York City on September 22, 1975.
The grievants, both installer-repairmen, were suspended
on the day and for the periods indicated in the stipulated issues,
for refusing to perform the same work assignment - to climb a
telephone pole, using a ladder, to perform certain work aloft.
The parties recognize the fundamental rule that employees
must carry out work duties as assigned, and thereafter may grieve
if they considered those assignments to be outside the scope of
their job classification or other wise improper.

What is involved

in this case is a recognized exception to that rule, namely the
"safety exception."

The grievants, and the Union on their behalf,

contend that this assignment was too dangerous and unsafe under
the conditions then present; that to perform the work would have
subjected the grievants to bodily danger, and that therefore they
were justified

in refusing to perform the work within the meaning

of the foregoing "safety

exception."

-3Specifically it is contended that the job assignment was
dangerous and unsafe because:
1. the pole (it was actually two poles, an
old one to be replaced, attached to a newly
installed pole) contained an insignia indicating "trouble aloft."
2. under prescribed procedure, because of
pedestrian and vehicular traffic in the area,
and because of broken cement underfoot, the
ladder to be used in ascending and working
aloft, had to be footed by a second employee.
3. live, wires belonging to the Boston Edison
Company (which use the poles jointly with the
Telephone Company) had lost much of their insulation, and were hanging down close to the
area at which the grievants were to work.
4. on the pole(s) was a streetlight, and light
arm, (also under the jurisdiction of the Electric
Company) and the through-bolt holding the light
arm to the pole was too close to the area where
the grievants were to work. There was no indication that the lamp arm, the through-bolt or the
electrical connections thereto were grounded.
If not, those locations as well as the entire
pole might have been energized with dangerously
high voltage, closer to the work area of the
grievants than the Company's rules allow.
5. the ladder which the grievants were directed
to use and from which they would perform the work
was too short to permit the performance of this
work within the Company's prescribed safety
procedures. (The procedures call for work to be
done by standing not above the fourth rung from
the top of a ladder. It is asserted that the
ladder's length would have required the grievants
to stand at least two rungs from the top).
In my judgement when the "safety exception" is invoked,
the burden is on the employee (and the Union on his behalf) to
show not simply that he had sincere and good faith belief that
the work was unsafe and dangerous beyond the requirements of his

-4job classification but also:
1. that an unsafe and dangerous condition
endangering his "life or limb" and beyond
his job classification in fact existed, in
support of his sincere belief, and that his
belief related to that factual condition(s);
2. that at the time he refused to perform
the assignment he expressed his fears not
generally, but by specific reference to the
unsafe and/or dangerous conditions (contrasted
with an attempt later to justify his refusal
by referral to an unsafe condition which he
did not know about when he refused to perform
the work order);
3. that the dangerous and unsafe condition
could not be eliminated or neutralized through
normal or reasonable methods which the employee
knew or should have been familiar with, and
was capable of employing as part of his job;
While there is some question in my mind about the
motives of the grievants in refusing to perform the assignment, and while the record is unclear as to whether both
grievants knew of the alleged aforementioned unsafe conditions
when they refused to go aloft (they and their Union representative objected at the time only because the ladder was
not to be footed by a second bargaining unit employee), I fine
I need not make determinations in thos regards.

Based on

the record before me I am satisfied, within the conditions I
have previously set forth under which the "safety exception"
may be invoked, that the issue narrows simply to the length
of the ladder to be used.

-5 The insignia on the pole indicating "trouble aloft" is
not a legitimate basis to refuse to work aloft on or in the
area of that pole.

Indeed the Union does not make that asser-

tion, but merely refers to the insignia as an indication that
there may be a dangerous condition aloft.
danger from the live

Assuming a real

uninsulated Edison wires; from the

potentially energized street lamp, lamp arm and through-bolt;
and assuming that all or some of those electrical dangers were
too close to the area at which the grievants were to work, all
could have been effectively eliminated or neutralized by a
procedure which I find these two grievants knew of and knew how
to utilize.

Specifically their use of a B voltage tester could

have indicated to them, before they reached any area of danger,
whether the pole or any section of it was energized and if so,
their use of a "temporary bond" would have eliminated or
neutralized

any of those electrical dangers while they performed

the work as assigned.

Therefore the conditions set forth in

Item 3 above, namely that the potentially dangerous or unsafe
condition could not be eliminated or neutralized, was not met
in this case.

Instead, because those hazards could have been

readily handled by equipment and

methods

known to the grievants

as part of their work procedures, the grievants may not now rely
upon those dangers to justify their refusal to perform the
assigned work.

-6The same is true with regard to "footing" the ladder.

The

grievants knew or should have known of the method and procedure
to "lash" the ladder when work is being performed aloft by a
single employee without assistance below.

The lashing procedure

would have eliminated any potential danger attendant to the
absence of an employee at the foot of the ladder.

Moreover, as

to one of the grievants, his supervisor offered to foot the
ladder for him.

So, as to that grievant, though he may have

had a subsequent grievance over the performance of bargaining
unit work by a supervisory employee, he cannot claim that he
was endangered by the failure of someone to foot the ladder.
That leaves the length of the ladder to be considered.

I

find the evidence on that item to be sharply conflicting, offsetting and hence indeterminative.

The Union's case is that

the ladder was too short; that the day before when one of the
grievants performed the same work "under protest" he was forced
to stand on the second rung from the top, a position both
dangerous and proscribed by the Company's operating rules.

On

the other hand there is the offsetting testimony in the record
by the supervisor who climbed the ladder and performed the work
after the grievants refused, that he was able to do the work at
waist height, standing on the fourth rung from the top.

And

there is no evidence in the record of any significant difference
in height between the grievants and that supervisor which would
make any material difference.

Additionally, as is its right

-7in making summation argument, the Company in its brief set
forth certain drawings and mathematical dimensions which
support the assertion that a ladder of this length (24 feet)
could be placed at a proper angle and that an employee working
from it could perform the work involved in this case at about
waist level standing on the fourth rung from the top.

In short

with the burden on the grievants to prove dangerous or unsafe
conditions, the evidence on the single remaining question,
namely the adequacy of the length of the ladder simply has not
met that burden.
For the foregoing reasons I do not find that the grievants
or the Union on their behalf have shown that the work assignments involved were or would have remained so unsafe or
dangerous to life and limb as to warrant a refusal to perform
those duties.

Accordingly the suspensions of the grievants

are upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Locals 2222, 2320-27, AFL-CIO

AWARD OF ARBITRATORS
Case No. 1130-0633-74

and
New England Telephone Company

The Undersigned Arbitrators having been duly designated
in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement between the above
named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties make the following AWARD:
The grievances on the suspensions of
Splicers F. Samuel, R. Duggan, D. May
and J. Dowd present an arbitrable issue
in this case.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Vincent J. Luca, Jr.
Concurring

James Grandfield
Dissenting
DATED: April 14, 1975
STATE OF New York )ss.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this fourteenth day of April, 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
toeal 210 International Brotherhood
of teamsters
Award

and
Continental Connector Corporation
lendersigned Arbitrator, having been designated la
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows?
fh* discharge of Dorothy Lee Brown Wailey is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. She shall be reinstat**
ed but without back pay. The period from discharge
to reinstatement shall b« deemed a disciplinary sm*~
•penslom for an uBasatlitfaetory attendance record. She
is on notice that unless that record shows immediate
improvement and becomes and remains satisfactory, she
would b® subject to summary discharge.

trie
Arbitrator

April V
STAfi <»? JSum fork
Hew York)

**

On this b day of April, 1972, before we personally came
and appeared iric J. Schtnerts to »« known and known to me to
be the individual described In and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

la the Matter of the
between
110 International Brotherhood

of
and

Continental Collector Corporation.
The stipulated Issue 1st
Was there Just cause for the discharge of
Dorothy Lee Brown Walley? If not what shall
be fhe remedy?
f

A hearing was hold at the offices of the Aa®ric«n Arbitration AP sec la t ton on February 18, It72 at which time Mrs.
Walley, hereinafter referred to at the "grlevant," and representatives of the above named Onion and Coatpany, hereinafter
referred to jointly as the "parti**," appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross enaalne witnesses. The parties
expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The grlevant was discharged because of excessive tardiness and absenteeism.
It Is clear and well settled, as I stated in an earlier
Award between the parties, that the Company is not required
to indefinitely tolerate excessive absenteeism or other irregular- attendance by an employee.
However, In the instant ease, though over a three year
period from 1949 until Hay of 1970 the grlevant*e record of
attendance and punctuality has not been satisfactory, I am
persuaded that there are mitigating circumstances which warrant
a reduction to the penalty*

•• a the griavttttt'f principal offense for the total period
has tNum tardiness in reporting to work. Her absentee record
•hewed so®® discernible iaarevssM&t in 1971. But for her con*
tlotting inability to report to work on tine X think she may
mot have b*en discharged.
Chronic efceessiva tardiness, standing alone, is also
grounds for termination if it continues following imposition
of lesser penalties pursuant to a progressive discipline forMala. However, in the instant ease I conclude that some of
0

the circumstances surrounding the grlevant *s tardiness were
not only beyond her control» hut were due to a temporary condition, namely pregnancy, no longer present.

I am satisfied

that this eonditlon and its attendant Illnesses were responsible for a portion of her tardiness. Hence there is reason
to believe that her record should and can Improve. Also, many
of her latenesses were a matter of minutes, whieh though not
excused or excusable, are not as serious or disruptive to the
Company's operation as if they had been of greater duration or
if she had not reported to work at all.
Finally, and perhaps most important at least to my salad,
is that offenses of this type should be subjected to a disciplinary suspension step within a progressive discipline formula. By losing ti&e from work without pay, an employe® is
impressed with the seriousness of the offense and the Company's
diasatlsfacttloa with his record. Subjected to a temporary
removal from fche payroll, an offending employee Is given the
unequivocal notice short of discharge that he must re-

- 3habilitate himself to retain his Job. I am not persuaded that
a warning notice alone, not matter how many, can impress an
employee that his Job is in Jeopardy If his record does not
markedly Improve. And that Is why oost arbitrators require an
intermediate step between warmings and discharge, namely a
disciplinary suspension - in eases where summary discharge Is
not warranted,
In my Judgment this ease, which Involves primarily tardiness rather than absenteeism, and where the tardiness in many
instances was for short periods of time, and conceivably in
§osie others the result of pregnancy, falls within that general
rule.
Accordingly I shall reduce the grlevant's penalty of
discharge to a suspension, the shall be reinstated but without back pay, and the period of time from discharge to reinstatement shall be deecaed a disciplinary suspension*

She is. on

notice that unless her attendance record shows immediate improvement and becomes and remains satisfactory, she would be
subject to summary discharge.

rlc
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Locals 2222, 2320-27, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN

and
New England Telephone Company

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement dated September 26, 1971 between
the above named Union and Company, the Undersigned was designated
as the Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration to hear and
decide, together with the Company and the Union designees to said
Board the following stipulated issue:
Do the grievances on the suspensions
of Splicers F. Samuel, R. Dugjan, D.
May and J. Dowd represent an arbitrable
issue in this case?
Messrs. James L. Grandfield and Vincent J. Luca, Jr.
served respectively as the Company and Union Arbitrators on the
Board of Arbitration.
A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts on January 16,
1975, at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Oath of the Arbitrators was expressly waived.

The parties

filed post hearing briefs, following which they agreed to waive
executive session of the Board of Arbitration.

-2The Company's assertion that the issue is not arbitrable
is overly technical, and in this case unnecessary to preserve
the purpose, meaning, and integrity of Article 9 Section 9.01 of
the contract.

That Section reads:
If the Union contends that the intent
and meaning of one or more of the Articles
of this Agreement (except as otherwise provided in the Agreement) has been violated
by the Company, it may demand arbitration
provided that written notice is received
by the Company no later than thirty (30)
calendar days after the conclusion of the
final step of the grievance procedure.

By subsequent Agreement the parties stipulated:
2. Under Article 9 of the collective bargaining agreement effective September 26,
1971, the date of post-mark on an envelope
containing a Demand for Arbitration (AAA
form) to the Company shall be considered
the date the demand for arbitration is
made on the Company.
The effect if the subsequent agreement is to make timely
a Demand for Arbitration that is mailed and postmarked on the
thirtieth day after the conclusion of the final step of the
grievance procedure, irrespective of when it thereafter reaches
the Company.
In the instant case it is undisputed that the Union's
Demand for Arbitration was not received by the Company within the
thirty calendar days prescribed in Section 9.01, nor was it mailed
and postmarked on the thirtieth day as permitted under the
subsequent Agreement.

Instead the Union hand delivered the Demanc

-3-

for Arbitration to the Company on the thirty-first calendar day.
It is uncontested that it was received by the Company shortly
after the opening of business on that thirty-first day.

Also, it

is stipulated that the thirty-first day, on which the Demand for
Arbitration was hand delivered to the Company was a Monday (June
10, 1974).

The thirtieth calendar day, Sunday (June 9, 1974),

was of course, a non-working day.
Had the Union mailed its Demand for Arbitration to the
Company on Sunday, June 9th, and had it been postmarked on that
day, the Union would have been in compliance with Section 9.01
as modified by the subsequent Agreement, and the Company would
not have raised the issue of arbitrability.
I find what actually happened to be of insignificant
difference.

For assuming "next day" mail delivery is assured

in Boston and delivery is made before or shortly after offices
open for business, the Union's hand delivery of the Demand for
Arbitration reached and became known to the Company at the same
time as if it had been mailed on the thirtieth day.
Based on the foregoing, I fail to see how the Company
was prejudiced by the Union's failure to precisely follow the
procedural requirements of Article 9 in filing its Demand for
Arbitration.

Manifestly, the intent and purpose of the time limit

-4set forth therein is to prevent grievances from festering after
they had cleared though the grievance procedure; to protect the
Company from the requirement that it arbitrate grievances that
are stale after the Company has reason to believe, as a result
of Union inaction, that the Union did not intend to arbitrate
that matter; and to prevent unreasonable delays during which
witnesses may become unavailable, memories may fail, and evidence
may not be so readily at hand.
in the instant situation.

None of these factors are present

Article 9 requires that the Union's

Demand for Arbitration be mailed and postmarked no later than
the thirtieth day following the conclusion of the final steps in
the grievance procedure.

The purpose and effect of that require-

ment is that the Company receive notice of the Union's Demand for
Arbitration by the thirty-first day or shortly thereafter depending upon the efficiency of the postal service.

Here, the Company

received notice of the Union's intent to arbitrate within the
time intended under Article 9.
the foregoing circumstances

Consequently there were none of

of delay which could prejudice the

Company's preparation and presentation of its case on the merits.
In my view to uphold the Company's technical argument
under the particular circumstances in this case, would introduce
into the collective bargaining agreement an antiquated concept
of rigid common law pleading.

I am certain that that is not what

the parties want or was intended under Article 9.

-5In sum, though the Union did not follow the procedures
of Section 9.01 of the contract as modified by paragraph 2 of
the subsequent Agreement precisely and absolutely in every respect,
its notice to the Company of its intent to arbitrate this case
exceeded any requirement of "substantial compliance."

I would

characterize the Union's notice to the Company in the instant
case as constituting "virtual compliance", which in no way that
I can see prejudiced the Company's rights and opportunity to
prepare

and present its full substantive case on the grievances.

In fact I do not even see that the Company has been inconveniencec
Accordingly the grievances are arbitrable.

Eric y. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
International Brotherhood of Telephone
'
Workers, Locals 2222, 2320-27
'
'
and
'
"
New
England Telephone & Telegraph Company '
_ _ „ _ _ _ „ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ „ _ „ _ _ !

Award
of
Arbitrators

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated September 2, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award as
follows:
There was not just cause for the discharge of Chester
Zaremba within the meaning of Article 9.03 of the
contract. His discharge is reduced to a two month
suspension. He shall be reinstated with back pay
less pay for the two month suspension and less earnings if any from employment elsewhere during the
period of the discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Leonard J. Sprague
Concurring

Norman I. Baker
Dissenting
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DATED: May
1972
STATE OF New York )_„
.
' oo .
COUNTY OF
)

.

On this
day of May, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1972
)ss .
)

On this
day of May, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Leonard J. Sprague to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1972
)ss. :
)

On this
day of May, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Norman I. Baker to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of Telephone
Workers, Locals 2222, 2320-27
~

'
i
'
'
1

and
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.

'
'
'

Opinion
of
Chairman

In accordance with Article 9 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective September 2, 1968 between New England
Telephone & Telegraph Company, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers,
Locals 2222, 2320-27, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a tripartite
Board of Arbitration to hear and decide, together with the Company and Union designees to said Board, the following stipulated issue:
Was the Company without just cause in discharging
Chester Zaremba within the meaning of Article 9.03
of the contract? If so what should be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Boston, Massachusetts on March 8,
1972 at which time Mr. Zaremba, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

Messrs.

Norman I. Baker and Leonard J. Sprague served as the Company
and Union Arbitrators respectively on the Board of Arbitration.
The parties expressly waived the Arbitrators' oath.
The parties filed post hearing briefs.

The Board of

Arbitration met in executive session in New York City on May 17,
1972.

- 2 The pertinent part of Article 9.03 of the contract delineating the authority of the Board of Arbitration to determine
the propriety of a discharge reads as follows:
If such grievance involves a discharge or disciplinary action, the Board of Arbitration shall determine whether the discharge or disciplinary action
was for just cause, and may not substitute its judgment for that of the Company unless it finds that
the Company acted without making a reasonable investigation or that it acted upon evidence that
could not have led a reasonable person to take such
action.
Based on the foregoing contract language, I conclude that
the Company's decision to discharge an employee may be overturned by a Board of Arbitration only if it finds that the
Company acted without making a reasonable investigation or if
a reasonable person would not have imposed the penalty of discharge upon the evidence in the record.
I find nothing unreasonable about the Company's investigation of the events and facts leading up to the grievant's discharge.

But I am not satisfied that the evidence in the record

before us in this arbitration, would have led a reasonable person to impose the penalty of discharge.
I am persuaded that the Company discharged the grievant
primarily because it believed he was part of a criminal conspiracy, or at least a willing accessory to that conspiracy, to
obtain confidential Company information from which certain
criminal elements could locate and assassinate an informer
sequestered by the FBI somewhere in New England.

In my judg-

ment the Company only secondarily charges the grievant with
violations of Company rules and a Federal statute regarding

- 3 the confidentiality of the telephone records.
Based on my analysis of the evidence before this Board of
Arbitration, I find that the Company has adequately proved the
latter secondary charges, not the principal charge - at least
not by the standard of clear and convincing evidence traditionally required in discharge cases.
This is not to say that the grievant was not a participant
in the alleged criminal scheme but rather that the evidence
presented falls significantly short of the measure of proof required for a reasonable person to find the grievant culpable.
The United States Attorney and a Federal Grand Jury investigating crime in the New England area had before it the same
evidence regarding the grievant which was submitted in this
arbitration.
up.

Yet an indictment was neither obtained nor handed

Indeed the record indicates that the grievant?s role in

seeking the proscribed information from the records of the Company was fully investigated by the FBI, considered by the U.S.
Attorney and the Grand Jury, and no criminal action was commenced against him.
The question therefore simply is whether this Board of
Arbitration should on the same evidence, but based on the lesser
standards of proof acceptable in arbitration cases, as compared
to criminal matters, find the grievant culpable of participating in that alleged conspiracy.
I find we should not.

Though the U.S. Attorney testified

in the arbitration hearing, he did not (and indeed is prohibited
from doing so) say what transpired before the Grand Jury.

He

- 4merely affirmed the fact that though the Grand Jury did not
indict, he nonetheless requested the Company "to take disciplinary action" against the grievant.

Neither in making that re-

quest of the Company nor in his testimony in this arbitration
did the U.S. Attorney explain his reasons for making that request.

No doubt it was based upon his evaluation of the in-

vestigation of the grievant, or on what took place before the
Grand Jury.

Just what that is or was remains speculative. And

speculation is not the kind of clear and convincing evidence
required to convince a reasonable person that the penalty of
discharge is warranted.

No doubt the testimony of the U.S.

Attorney in this arbitration was designed to persuade the Board
of Arbitration that it should infer that the grievant had some
nefarious connection with the alleged conspiracy, and that
based on that inference the Company's decision to discharge
the grievant ought to be upheld.

Again we are asked to substi-

tute "inference" for the traditional quantum of clear and convincing evidence.

And again, in my judgment, a reasonable per-

son would not find that type of inferential conclusion to be
adequate support for the penalty of discharge.
Finally, the grievant, in his testimony in this arbitration, expressly denied any participation in a conspiracy or
knowledge of any reason why his brother and one Tilley wanted
the toll call records.

The Company argues that this testimony

should not be believed because, concededly, the grievant lied
in the first stage of the investigation about who requested
him to obtain that information.

Also the Company argues •„

- 5 that the grievant's testimony should not be believed because
if he knew Tilley for a significant number of years he must
have known that Tilley had an extensive police record and that
a request for telephone records must have been for an improper
purpose.

I do not dispute totally the Company's reasoning that

because he first lied and because he could not have known Tilley
for so many years without knowing his criminal background, the
grievant's testimony is suspect.

Yet in my view - and I believe

in the mind of a reasonable person - this degree of suspicion
is just not enough to establish a clear and convincing connection between the grievant's efforts to obtain the prohibited information and his knowing participation in an alleged criminal
conspiracy.

For other explanations are at least equally possible

and logical.
I can conceive of how he may have thought that his status
in the eyes of his brother and Tilley may have been diminished
had he involved them when the investigation began; and this
could well have been enough reason for him to lie without imputing to him knowledge of why they allegedly wanted the telephone records.

Indeed when the investigation was assumed by

the FBI the grievant told the truth.

No doubt because he then

realized the apparent seriousness of the investigation.

And

confronted with an investigation of that magnitude, truthful
answers were obviously more important to him than his standing
with his brother and Tilley.
Also, though the Company offered no direct evidence to
rebut the grievant's testimony that he did not know Tilley1s
criminal record, I cannot conclude that even if he had it means

- 6 he knew the particular purpose for which Tilley may have wanted
the telephone call information.

For a variety of reasons other

than being part or having knowledge of any alleged conspiracy
the grievant may have wished to accommodate Tilley; but any
such accommodation cannot alone implicate the grievant in any
criminal plans which Tilley and others may have had.
What I am saying is not that these are factual explanations
for the grievant's action or that the grievant did not in fact
seek to obtain the telephone records for a known criminal purpose, but that absent other implicating evidence these explanations are at least as reasonable as any unsavory interpretation.
In summary I must conclude that that major element in the
Company's case against the grievant - an element which in my
judgment caused his termination - has not been proved up to the
level required in discharge cases.

Therefore, in my view a

reasonable person, unconvinced of the grievant's culpability
with regard to the alleged criminal conspiracy, would not have
taken discharge action against him.

Accordingly under Article

9.03 of the contract the discharge shall be set aside.
The remaining question is one of remedy.

In the stipulat-

ed issue the parties gave the Board of Arbitration authority to
fashion a remedy in the event we found that the Company was without just cause within the meaning of Article 9.03 of the contract.

Having so found we are authorized to fashion what we

consider to be an appropriate remedy.
I am satisfied that the grievant's efforts to obtain confidential telephone call records was either a violation or
attempted violation of an express Company rule and possibly a

- 7 Federal statute.

That the grievant may not have known the im-

port of the rule and statute is possible.
excuse him.

But even so I cannot

It is undisputed that he signed statements during

the course of his employment acknowledging familiarity with
that rule and statute.

And while employees may sign certain

statements in connection with rules and laws without a conscious
understanding of what they have read or are supposed to read, I
have no choice but to conclude that the grievant had constructive if not actual knowledge of the rule and statute prohibiting
the disclosure of telephonic communications and was bound to adhere to them.

And though technically nothing was "disclosed,"

because the grievant did not obtain the information, I find that
an "attempt" to do what the rule and statute prohibit is a violation in and of itself, for which discipline is warranted.
The extent of the grievant's inquiry of the Company to obtain the record of toll telephone calls originating from particular telephone numbers is not disputed.

He first called a

foreman who referred him to a business office supervisor.

That

supervisor told him that she could not discuss the matter further.

The grievant then made a second effort by calling an

account manager.

That manager told the grievant that he could

not give him the information requested and reprimanded the grievant for seeking it.

No further effort was made by the grievant

to obtain the information.

Though violative of a Company rule

and possibly a Federal statute, I do not find the grievant's
efforts to obtain the information to have been as persistent or
unyielding as the Company suggests.

He did not try to get the

- 8telephone records in a clandestine manner, but went directly to
managerial and supervisory personnel.

Though the Company

suggests that this is an ideal way by one with criminal intent
to turn aside suspicion it is also the logical way that an unsophisticated and innocent employee would attempt to obtain
those records.

So again the Company's extreme explanation is

no more reasonable or acceptable than one that is not incriminating.
Accordingly I find only a bare violation of the Company
rule and possibly the Federal statute.

The grievant should have

known better and therefore should not have sought those telephone records.

He knew or should have known of the rule and

statute prohibiting disclosure, and should not have made inquiry
which could have led to disclosure.

But based on the record be-

fore me I cannot find that he violated the rule and statute with
criminal intent or with any other nefarious objective.

There-

fore, for what has been established against him - and because in
the public interest the integrity of the rule and statute must
be maintained - a disciplinary suspension without pay of two
months is sufficient.

Accordingly the grievant's discharge is

reduced to a two month suspension without pay.

He shall be re-

instated and his records and pay shall be adjusted accordingly.

Eric
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey
Local 827, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO

Award

and
New Jersey Bell Telephone Company

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated May 29, 1971 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Award, as follows:
The Company discharged Robert Ball with proper reason
within the meaning of Article VII Section 2,x»f the
Collective Bargaining Agreement„

Eric J\z
Chairman

J 0 B. White
Concurring

C 0 J. Werkley
Concurring

John Crenny
Dissenting

Edgar M. Price
Dissenting

c

DATED: April V 1972
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

),
)'

On th±s(_j day of April, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: April
STATE OF

1972
)

COUNTY OF

)

On this
day of April, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared J. B. White to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1972
)ss. :
)

On this
day of April, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared C. J. Werkley to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1972
)ss •
)

On this
day of April, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared John Crenny to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1972
)
)

On this
day of April, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared Edgar M. Price to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
Case No. 1330 1217 71

- 2 In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey
Local 827, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO
Opinion
of
Chairman

and
New Jersey Bell Telephone Company

In accordance with Article XI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 29, 1971 between Telephone Workers
Union and New Jersey Local 827, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," and New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, hereinafter
referred to as the "Company," the Undersigned was selected as
the Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitrators to hear and
decide, together with the Union and Company designees to said
Board, the following stipulated issue;
Did the Company discharge Robert Ball with proper
reason within the meaning of Article VII Section 2
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement? If not
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in New York City on January 24, 1972, at which
time Mr. Ball, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and
representatives of the Union and Company appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

Messrs.

John Crenny and Edgar M. Price served as the Union members of
the Board of Arbitration.

Messrs. J. B. White and C 0 J 0

Werkley served as the Company members.

- 3 The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on
March 15, 1972 following which the hearings were declared
closed.
The charge against the grievant, which is the basis for
his discharge, is that he assaulted his foreman,,
It is well settled that an unprovoked assault by an employee on a supervisor is insubordination of the most obvious
and blatant type and grounds for summary discharge irrespective of that employee's prior work record.

If the assault is

proved and was unprovoked, whether the penalty should be less
than discharge or otherwise mitigated
because of an employee's
"
long years of service and prior unblemished record, is a
matter for consideration by the employer not the Arbitrator.
Assuming that the Company has met its burden of establishing
the grievant's culpability I could not contractually fault the
Company's decision under Article VII Section 2 of the contract
to impose the ultimate penalty of discharge even if I believed
that because the grievant had worked satisfactorily for 17 years,
a long term suspension would be sufficient to both set an example and uphold the integrity. of the Company's disciplinary
procedures.

In short, because discharge is a proper penalty

for that kind of offense, this Arbitrator cannot substitute
his judgment for that of the Company even if he believes that
a long term suspension would be sufficiently protective of
the Company's rights.
There is no real dispute that the grievant physically engaged the foreman.

The record shows that while Foreman Boucher

- 4 was orally reprimanding the grievant for remaining out with
his truck after quitting time, the grievant forcefully grabbed
the foreman's tie and thrust him violently backward against
one of the trucks; and stopped only when separated from the
foreman by the physical intervention of other employees.
What is in dispute is the matter of provocation.

The

grievant and the Union on his behalf contend that Boucher provoked the incident by four acts of provocation.

First that

he "pushed his men too hard" and maintained too close a surveillance over their activities including surveillance that
very afternoon.

Second, that he harassed the grievant partic-

ularly^ picked on him and threatened to get him fired.

Third,

that during the oral reprimand the grievant grabbed Boucher's
tie and thrust him backward only after Boucher raised an arm
menacingly.

And fourth, that Boucher persistently blew cigar

smoke into the grievant's face during the course of the oral
reprimand.
Based on the evidence before me I do not find the first
two defenses to constitute either justification for or provocation of the assault.
and fourth defenses.

And the facts do not support the third
Whether or not Boucher pushed his men

"too hard" or maintained close supervision over their activities is immaterial, because assuming he did, the grievant's
remedy is not a physical assault, but to grieve if Boucher's
supervisory activities were improper.
The same is true if Boucher unjustifiably picked on him,
or discriminated against him or dealt with him unfairly, or

- 5 unjustifiably sought or threatened his termination.
The testimony in the record does not support the assertion
that Boucher raised his arm first before the grievant grabbed
his tie and thrust him backward.

Indeed the testimony of a

Union witness, who observed the incident, was that Boucher
raised his arm only after the grievant grabbed the tie0
latter version is more plausible.

This

The raising of an arm in

the manner suggested is a normal reflex reaction to an attack.
The fourth point is the one upon which the Union and the
grievant principally rely, namely that Boucher blew cigar smoke
into the grievant1s face.

Boucher denies it, and no other wit-

nesses were able to testify decisively regarding that phase of
the altercation.
Critical and determinative, to my mind, is the grievant's
own written statement of the incident and his complaints about
Boucher.

Though his statement consumes almost four single

spaced hand written pages, nowhere does he mention the cigar
smoke contention.

It seems to me that had Boucher blown cigar

smoke in the grievant's face, that assertion, so proximate to
the incident involved, would have been mentioned prominently
in the grievant's report of what happened and in his complaints
about Boucher.

For the grievant to have omitted it entirely

especially in view of the conflicting testimony, permits of
only one reasonable conclusion, and that is that that phase of
the incident did not take place.
I recognize that a rigid and demanding foreman can generate anger and emotional reactions among his employees.

But

even if the grievant had become angered and lost his self control because of Boucher's supervisory methods, I cannot excuse

- 6 the assault, or find "provocation" within the proper meaning
of that word in assault cases for that reason alone.
Accordingly based on my introductory remarks regarding
just cause for this type of offense and the facts as I have
found them, I have no choice but to uphold the discharge.
Mitigation of that decision because of the grievant's long
years of service is now a matter within the exclusive discretion
of the Company.

I believe that with its right to discharge for

this type of offense now clearly upheld by this decision, the
Company would not prejudice or subvert its disciplinary authority if it now decided to reduce the penalty to a long term suspension0

Nor in my judgment would such a determination by the

Company be injurious to the normal supervisor-employee relationship because, for other reasons, Boucher has now been transferred to a different work jurisdiction.

However, any such

change in the penalty is a matter solely for the Company's consideration.

Eric^'J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Julie Newmar

CONSENT AWARD
and

Case #1330-1348 74

Kenneth D. Snyder
In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the contract between the above named parties the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide certain disputes between said parties.
A hearing was scheduled for September 17, 1975. At that
time the parties settled the issues in dispute.

At their request

the terms of the settlement, as follows, are made a CONSENT AWARD
1. Kenneth D. Snyder shall pay to Julie Newmar
the sum of two thousand four hundred dollars
($2,400).
2. Travelers Insurance Company shall pay to Julie
Newmar the sum of five hundred and fifty four
dollars ($554).
3. The aforementioned total sum of two thousand nine
hundred and fifty four dollars ($2,954) is in full
settlement of all claims herein by either party
against the other. There shall be an exchange of
mutual general relases between Julie Newmar and
Kenneth D. Snyder individually and Atlantic Buffet,
Inc., covering all claims of each party against the
other.

DATED: September 18, 1975
STATE OF New York)gs
COUNTY OF Nassau )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this eighteenth day of September, 1975, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
AFL-CIO
-and-

OPINION
and
AWARD

New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of Charles Heissenbuttel
without proper reason under Article 10 of
the contract?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on July 23rd and July 24th, 1974 at
which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The arbitrator's

oath was expressly waived.
Under the terms of Artcle 10 the authority of the
Arbitrator is limited to either upholding the discharge or
reversing it in its entirety.

The Arbitrator is not authorized

to reduce the discharge to any lesser penalty even if he concludes that some disciplinary penalty short of discharge is
proper.

Therefore unless the instant discharge was for proper

reasons the grievant must be reinstated and reimbursed in
accordance with Section 10.03 of the contract.
A careful review of the entire record persuades me that
the Company's case falls just short of establishing proper
reasons for the ultimate penalty of dismissal.

-2As an authoratative Company witness testified, the
grievant was discharged for "altercation and falsification."
More specifically the Company charges him with engaging in
a fight, in which he was the aggressor, with a fellow employee.
And thereafter refusing to disclose to the Company that a fight
had taken place and falsely claiming an injury which he sustained
in or as a consequence of the fight as an "on the job injury."
The Company asserts that the grievant clung to his false story
though given an opportunity to tell the truth, and only finally
disclosed the fact that a fight took place subsequent to that
opportunity.
The evidence in the record does not establish that the
grievant was the aggressor in the fight.
otherwise.

The grievant testified

He asserts that the other employee, Mel Scarpatti,

first abused him verbally on an intercom system and thereafter
without provocation assaulted him in the break room.

His

testimony was not significantly shaken on cross-examination.
If there were witnesses to the fight none were called to testify.
Most important, Scarpatti, though still in the Company's employ
and available, was not called to refute the grievant's testimony.
I do not consider the writeen report which Scarpatti gave to
the Company as sufficiently probative to overturn the grievant's
direct testimony, especially when he could have been called to
testify.

So the Company's burden to establish the principal

charge against the grievant regarding the fight has not been

-3met by the requisite standard of proof.
There is no question that the grievant refused to disclose
that a fight had taken place and persisted in that refusal
despite the opportunities the Company gave him to disclose the
truth.

And there is no question that he falsified his injury

as job-connected.

In my judgement a failure or refusal of an

employee to cooperate honestly with his employer in an investigation surrounding an injury and the making of a false report
concerning how the injury occurred could be proper reasons for
discharge unless the employee offered some believable mitigating
explanation, and especially if the employee significantly benefited
from his lack of candor.

And even if he offered a mitigating

explanation or if he in no way benefited therefrom a disciplinary
penalty short of dismissal would be warranted under a different
contractual relationship which permitted the Arbitrator to
fashion that remedy.
I find a mitigating explanation which stands uncontroverted.
The grievant testified that Scarpatti pleaded with him, in the
interest of the latter's job security, not to disclose that a
fight had taken place.

Again Scarpatti was not called to

testify in refutation, and again the grievant's testimony was
not impeached in cross-examination.

Indeed that testimony is

consistent with a finding of fact that Scarpatti, rather than
the grievant was the aggressor.
Nor do I find that the grievant gained any significant
benefit from his false assertion that the injury above his eye
was an on-the-job injury.

The Company suggests it might have

been liable under a Workmen's Compensation claim.

Yet the

-4grievant did not file for compensation and testified that he had
no intention to do so.

In view of my finding that the grievant

was not the aggressor but rather was subject to a surprise and
unprovoked assault by Scarpatti it is unlikely, under those
facts, that the grievant would have been subject to discharge.
And hence it cannot be argued that the benefit he sought by
falsifying the events was his own job protection.
The only' benefit which grievant obtained was two days
pay for the days he was out, which he received on the assumption
that the injury was job connected.

I do not consider this to

be the type of benefit which raises the grievant's offense to
the level of misconduct warranting a discharge.

And, considering

the apparent concession that he would not have been entitled to
that pay under the true circumstances of his injury, I do not
consider it inconsistent with the arbitrator's authority under
Article 10 to authorize the Company to recoup those two days
pay from the grievant following his reinstatement.

I shall so

provide in my Award.
Again I wish to make clear that in this case, had I the
authority, I would have imposed on the grievant a lengthy
disciplinary suspension.

But I am unable to conclude, based on

the record before me, that the facts constitute proper reason
for the extreme penalty of dismissal.

In the absence of counter-

vailing evidence and testimony I accept the grievant's statements
regarding the fight and his explanation as to why he did not
truthfully disclose what took place.

This conclusion is not

overturned by the fact that on cross-examination he did not

-5fully state the various employers for whom he had previously
worked.

The fact is that he listed all such employers on his

employment application; that that application was not falsified,
and that so far as the record before us is concerned there is
nothing about his former employment history which he had any
reason to hide.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
There was not proper reason for the
discharge of Charles Heissenbuttel. As
mandated by Article 10 of the contract
he must be reinstated and reimbursed in
accordance with Section 10.03. However
subsequent to his reinstatement the
Company may recoup from Mr. Heissenbuttel
an amount of money equivalent to the two
days pay which he would have not received
had the true facts concerning his injury
been known.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September^-0, 1974
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
On this ^*
day of September, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Trustees, New York City Taxicab Industry1
Local 3036, AFL-CIO Benefit Fund
'
i

AWARD

and
'
Nicel Operating Corp. and Corporations
t
on attached list, jointly and severally' i

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the contract between the above named parties, and having duly considered the evidence presented at the duly noticed hearing
°f January 14, 1975

makes the following AWARD:

For the period November 1973 through January 1974
Nicel Operating Corp. and Corporations on attached list are
i:& delinquent in payment to and owes the New York
City Taxicab Industry, Local 3036 Benefit Fund
the sum of Fifteen thousand nine hundred six dollars and
fifty three cents ($15,906.53), jointly and severally.
are
Accordingly said Employers^ directed to pay said
sum to the Fund forthwith.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED : Jifc»**J * ?t ^7J
STATE OF New /ork )
COUNTY OF NeW York) "'' "
On this*-/ day Of February, 1975 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Serial No.

Medallion

Nory Cab Corp.

23877

6J72

Nory Cab Corp.

23935

73

Narco Cab Corp.

23930

80

Narco Cab Corp.

23864

81

Nalco Cab Corp.

23941

82

Nalco Cab Corp.

23865

83

Nero Cab Corp.

285624214

84

Nero Cab Corp.

24217

85

Nikt Cab Corp.

24234

86

Niki Cab Corp.

24235

87

Niki Cab Corp.

24236

88

Noma Cab Corp.

24237

89

Noma Cab Corp.

24215

90

Nib Cab Corp.

24216

7R28

Nib Cab Corp.

24253

6J92

Nino Cab Corp.

288224269

6J60

Nino Cab Corp.

24258

61

Nimbus Cab Corp.

24250

62

Nimbus Cab Corp.

24252

6R93

Native Service Corp.

24260

5J48

Native Service Corp.

24261

49

Neap Service Corp.

24303

6J64

Neap Service Corp.

24289

65

Noton Cab Corp.

24279

68

Noton Cab Corp.

24268

69

Nanet Cab Corp.

24249

6J74

Nanet Cab Corp.

24227

75

Nelar Cab Corp.

24224

6R87

Nelar Cab Corp.

24226

6J77

Namba Cab Corp.

24225

78

Namba Cab Corp.

285624256

79

Narda Cab Corp.

24255

70

Narda Cab Corp.

24254

71

Nod Service Corp.

288224288

57

Nod Service Corp.

24290

56

Nougat Service Corp.

24278

27

Nougat Service Corp.

24271

28

Nougat Service Corp.

24307

29

Neal Service Corp.

24291

55

Nar Cab Corp.
Duet Operating Corp.
Dion Cab Corp.
Roar Service Corp.
Niva Cab Corp.

OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 2021, District Council 37,
American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case No. A-415-74

and
Off-Track Betting Corporation

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above
named Union and Employer, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said Union and Employer, makes the following
AWARD:
Mr. John Padovano, hereinafter
referred to as the grievant, shall
be examined by a psychiatrist mutually
selected by the Union and the Employer,
the expense of which shall be shared
equally by the Union and the Employer.
If the grievant is found fit for normal
duty as a cashier as a result of that
examination he shall be restored to work
as a cashier without back pay at a location to be determined by the Employer.
As a condition of continued employment,
the grievant shall undertake ongoing
psychiatric treatment by a psychiatrist
or a facility selected by him and the
Union and which is acceptable to the
Employer. Such treatment shall be on
at least a once a week basis unless the
psychiatrist or facility treating the
grievant deems that a lesser sequence of
treatment is all that is needed.

__

-2The grievant shall continue such
treatment until medically discharged
therefrom.
The Undersigned retains jurisdiction
over this case for the purposes of
implementation and compliance by the
Union, the Employer, and the grievant
with the foregoing.

Eric 3/ Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 2, 1975
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )S
On this
came and appeared
be the individual
instrument and he

second day of April, 1975, before me personally
Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING

In The Matter of the Fact Finding
between
District Council 37 AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
Local 2021, District Council 37 AFSCME,
AFL-CIO
and

RECOMMENDATIONS
of
FACT FINDER
Case M-109-75

New York City Off-Track Betting Corporation

On an experimental basis, horse racing at New York tracks
has been authorized and planned for eleven consecutive Sundays
beginning Sunday, June 8, 1975.
As a consequence, OTB intends to operate 109 of its 144
betting offices on those days.
The Union and OTB are in dispute over the rate of compensation to be paid bargaining unit cashiers assigned to work on any
of those Sundays.

The Union seeks double time.

OTB has offered

time and one half.
The issue as presented does not involve an interpretation
or application of the current collective bargaining agreement between the parties.

Although both sides have made reference to

the contract and the New York City Collective Bargaining

Law,

and what they consider to be their respective rights thereunder,
they do not rely thereon in attempting to resolve the Sunday pay
question.

Sensibly and in good faith they have tried to reach

agreement on that question by de novo direct negotiations, rather
than involve themselves in a confrontation on the meaning or
applicability of the contract or the "practical impact" or
unforeseeable circumstances" provisions of the New York City
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Collective Bargaining Law.

When direct negotiations failed to

produce a settlement they asked for mediation assistance; and
when, at the mediation session on May 30, 1975 it appeared that
the dispute could not be successfully mediated in the short time
available, asked that I make non-binding fact finding recommendations for resolution.
Accordingly I deem that what the parties want is a
recommendation

that reconciles the divergent positions of the

parties on grounds that are as equitable and reasonable to both
as possible.
OTB acknowledges

one point.

And that is that despite its

technical view that under the contract it could unilaterally
schedule Sunday work as a part of the regular work week at
straight time pay, to do so would simply be unacceptable and
contrary to general practices regarding pay for work performed
on a Sunday.

Hence, as a result of direct negotiations between

the parties and prior to this proceeding, OTB offered to pay for
Sunday work at the rate of time and one half regardless of when
during the work week Sunday fell.

OTB has continued that offer

in this proceeding.
The Union's demand for double time is based primarily on
two grounds.

First it points to the fact that pari-mutuel clerks

employed by the tracks are paid double time for Sunday work, and
argues that OTB cashiers should get no less.

Second, it asserts

that OTB work on Sunday is particularly burdensome because a large
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number of cashiers already work Saturdays as part of their
regular schedule.

And that those who may be required to work

both days w ill be deprived of time off that weekend, thereby
further disrupting their normal private lives and activities.
This major inconvenience the Union contends, must be compensated
for by pay at double time.

The Union argues further that double

time for Sunday work is all the more compelling under that
circumstance because pay for work performed on Saturday (a matter
covered by the contract, not involved in this proceeding, and
hence not before me) is at straight time unless that work exceeds
the fortieth hour of the work week.
OTB asserts that to pay double time for Sundays would have
an inexorable precedential effect on what the City of New York
may have to pay others in its employ; that in this period of
economic adversity and budget crisis the City cannot and should
not be faced with that precedent; and that OTB cannot and should
not be required to assume that responsibility.
The issue is therefore narrow.

Whether Sunday work should

be compensated at time and one half or double time.

(The parties

agree that in either event overtime pay shall not be "pyramided"
i.e. the contractual overtime payment for work in excess of forty
hours a week shall not be added to the time and one half or
double time for Sunday when work performed on the Sunday
constitutes hours in excess of forty).
Obviously, as is often the case in such disputes, there is
merit to the contentions of both sides.

I cannot shut my eyes

-4to the precedential effect on other City employment, if double
time for Sunday work is granted to OTB cashiers.

In these

times of extreme economic adversity and chronic budget inadequacies I do not find sufficient justification to add to
those troubles by recommending pay at double time for Sunday
work standing alone.
However, I do find an exception under which the bulk of
the employees should receive double time pay when they
work on Sunday.

The Union has made a persuasive argument

for special consideration for those assigned Sunday work
who have also worked the Saturday immediately preceeding.
OTB concedes that Saturdays are heavy and busy work days at those
OTB installations that are open.

On a rotational basis, 75 to

80 percent of the cashiers work Saturdays.

From the standpoint

of OTB it is an important day of business, and by contract the
Union and the employees, recognizing the nature of the OTB
business and the importance of Saturdays to that business, have
accommodated that fact by agreeing to include Saturdays, for
the most part, within the regular work week at straight time pay.
One consequence has been that employees who work Saturdays lose
one weekend day from time customarily available for leisure or
to spend with family and friends who are off work then.

Frankly,

in my view, to add an additional days work immediately thereafter - on the Sunday that follows - is simply too much of a
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disruption to an employee's normal life and too burdensome,
following such a heavy and straight time business day as
Saturday, to permit scheduling at a pay rate of only time and
one half.
I make no judgement on the adequacy of the Saturday rate
of pay.

That is not before me and is governed by the contract.

Any change is a matter for contract negotiation between the
parties when this current contract expires.

But, I think it

proper and appropriate in considering what should be paid to
an employee assigned to work on Sunday who has also worked the
Saturday before, to take cognizance of what happens on
Saturday and that

when the parties reached their contract

agreement to treat Saturday as a regular work day, Sunday
employment on the same weekend apparently was not seriously
anticipated or contemplated.
and logic not only compel

Under that circumstance, fairness

a recommendation that the rate of

pay for the second work day of a weekend, a

Sunday, be at

double time, but on balance, outweight what precedential effect
if any, it may have on the employment of other employees of the
City who may work under a similar schedule and conditions.
Finally it should be observed that these recommendations
are only temporary in nature.

Sunday racing is an experiment,

confined to eleven Sundays upcoming.

It remains to be seen if

it, and attendant Sunday employment, will contine thereafter.

-6Moreover, it is noted that the collective bargaining agreement
between the parties expires in one year, in June 1976, with
bargaining due to begin before that date.

So, within a

relatively short period of time both sides will have ample
opportunity to negotiate contractually on the matter of pay
for Sunday work, as well as on other terms and conditions of
employment.
In my view, these recommendations represent, for the
persent, a fair and justifiable resolution of the instant
dispute.

I hope both sides will consider them carefully and

fully and find them acceptable.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Fact Finder in
the above matter, makes the following voluntary recommendations:
1.

A bargaining unit employee who works on Sunday
and who also worked the Saturday immediately
preceeding, should be paid for Sunday at the
rate of double time.

2.

Bargaining unit employees who have not worked
the Saturday before should be compensated at
the rate of time and one half for work performed on Sunday.

Eric J. Schmertz
Fact Finder

DATED: June 4, 1975
STATE OF NEW YORK ) C! C
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

•

On this fourth day of June, 1975, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association,
International

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Overseas National Airways, Inc0

In accordance with Section 23 of the collective bargaining agreement between the Air Line Pilots Association, International, hereinafter referred to as the Association and Overseas
National Airways, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Employer,
the Undersigned was designated as the fifth member or Referee of
a tri-partite board of arbitration to hear and decide, together
with Association and Employer designees to said Board, a dispute
between the Association and the Employer involving the grievances
of D.A. O'Connor (ALPA Case Nos0 NY-68-74 and NY-75-74).
Messrs. James Correa and Richard Elten served as the
Employer representatives on the Board of Arbitration and Messrs.
Frank Foster and Gerald Smallwood served as the Associations
representatives on said Board0
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer on
January 29, 1975 at which time Mr0 O'Connor hereinafter referred
to as the grievant and representatives of the parties appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath of the Arbitrators was waived.

The

The parties filed post-

hearing briefs and the Board of Arbitration met in Executive
Session on July 1, 1975.
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This case involves the application and interpretation of
Section 6 (Deadheading) of the collective bargaining

agreement.

The facts concerning how and when the grievant traveled from
his flight termination point in Georgia to his domicile on the
West Coast; and therafter from that domicile to flight training school at Kennedy Airport prior to his next flight assignment, are not disputed and are amply set forth in the stenographic
record and in the briefs.
What is in dispute is whether the grievant was required to
travel both directions by direct route, and within certain time
limits in order to receive the full credited hours of service
for pay and flight time and per diem under Section 6, which he
claims in his grievances.
The Employer denied the grievant his claim because he did
not accomplish the deadheading "between points and on the date
or dates assigned by the Company."
Specifically it is the Employer's position that a pilot
must deadhead by direct route from his termination point to his
domicile and then from his domicile directly to his next assignment, and that each trip must be accomplished within no more
than one week earlier or later than the date or dates of the
deadheading assignment.
It is undisputed that the grievant did not travel directly
from his termination point in Georgia to his domicile on the
West Coast, but traveled from the first location to the second,
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circuitously, by way of his home in Islip, Long Island.

Also

and consequently he did not accomplish the deadheading assignment within one week earlier or later than the date or dates of
that assignment.

The same was true for his travel from the West

Coast to Kennedy Airport for ground school training.
The Association contends that the contract does not set
forth the travel method and time limitations which the Employer
says it requires.

It argues that so long as a pilot does not

"manipulate" the dates on which he travels to "pyramid" his
credited flight time from one calculated month to another, and
provided the Employer's monetary obligation in all respects under
Section 6 does not exceed what it would be required to pay or
credit the pilot had he traveled directly and with the one week
leeway, a pilot should not be foreclosed from traveling indirectly and at times more convenient to him, so long as he meets his
assignments on time.
The Employer's position is fully set forth in its Pilot
Bulletin No0 30-74 dated April 22, 1974.

However the details of

that Bulletin, particularly the explicit requirement that the
pilot accomplish his deadheading "between the points and on the
date or dates assigned by the Employer" are nowhere found in the
provisions of Section 6 of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Employer argues that its Bulletin is a reasonable, regulatory
implementation of Section 6 (because it wants to safeguard against

-4the "pyramiding" of credited flight time hours, and wishes to
know where a pilot is between assignments and when, approximately
he is traveling from one completed assignment to the next), but
primarily because the Bulletin "reaffirm(s) a long standing
practice concerning expenses and credit hours while deadheading
at Employer direction and assignment."

In short the Employer

asserts that its conditions on travel direction and time for
deadheading credit and pay are reasonable managerial rules in
implementation of Section 6 and supported by past practice.
Unless the "past practice" to which the Employer avers or
the long standing effectiveness of the restrictions can be
established, the reasonableness of the Employer's rule is not
before me in this proceeding simply because Pilot Bulletin No.
30-74 is dated April 22, 1974, subsequent to the events giving
rise to the instant grievances.

The Bulletin attempts to establish

a retroactive effect covering the grievances by stating that it
reaffirms a long standing past practice.

But that statement is

merely self serving unless prior past practice can be established
or unless there is persuasive evidence that the Employer's policy
set forth in that Bulletin was previously noticed to and adequately
disseminated amongst the affected employees prior to the events of
the instant grievances.
For the same reason I need not decide whether Mr. Simandl
testified as an authoritative representative of the Association
and whether his testimony binds the Association to the inter-
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pretation of Section 6 as set forth in the Bulletin.

Mr. Simandl

advanced views not dispositive of the instant grievances, because
his testimony concerning

the reasonableness or applicability of

that Bulletin was prospective, from April 22, 1974 forward.

Hence

whether from the date it was promulgated on April 22, 1974, Pilot
Bulletin 30-74 is a binding interpretation of Section 6 pursuant
to the Employer's managerial authority, is a question for the
future, not determinative of the instant grievances, both of
which predated that Bulletin.
What is consequential to the instant case is whether the
terms and conditions of that bulletin can be retroactively read
or implied into Section 6, to cover the instant case, either because of past practice or because its content had been previously
made known to the employees and the Union without objection or
by acceptance or acquiescence.

The burden of establishing past

practice or prior notice and dissemination rests with the party
alleging it, particularly where, as here, the explicit contract
language does not contain the restrictions which the Employer
seeks to impliedly introduce into the contract for its interpretation and application.

That burden, which is thus the Employer's

in this case, has not been met.

The record does not contain

sufficient evidence of prior cases in which deadheading credit
was denied pilots who failed to travel directly between points
and within the week leeway of the assigned dates.

Rather there

is information that pilots have traveled in different directions

-6and at different times than the Employer now prescribes, and have
received deadheading pay.

Additionally there is some evidence

in this record that the manner and method which the grievant
employed to get from his termination point in Georgia to the
West Coast (by way of his home in Is lip) was known to and affirmatively acted upon by representatives of the Employer, if not
expressly authorizwd.

In my view had the Employer's policy, as

set forth later in its April 22, Pilot Bulletin, been effectively
controlling at that time, it would or should have been known to
those who issued the grievant commercial airline tickets for his
circuitous travel and they and the Chief Pilot would or should
have acted decisively to either deny him those tickets or otherwise inform him of the restrictions in response to his notification
as to how he intended to travel during the "deadhead" period, but
they did not.

I take that to mean either that the policy was not

then in effect, or was not adequately disseminated to be known
both to the grievant and to those who acted on his travel plans.
And if that circumstance did not constitute actual or constructive
authorization for a deviation from the Employer's restrictions,
the grievant at least cannot be faulted in his belief that he
could so travel and still be eligible for deadheading credit under
Section 6.
For all the foregoing reasons, and with the provision as
stipulated by the Association at the hearing that it will not
permit a pilot to manipulate his deadheading travel time to pyramid

-7his flight credit, and that in no respect would the Employer's
monetary obligations under Section 6 exceed that to which a pilot
would be entitled had he traveled directly between points and
within prescribed dates, the grievant's claims for additional
credited hours of service for pay, flight time and per diem as
set forth in his grievances are granted.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators under
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the
above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties make the following AWARD:
The grievances of D.A. O'Connor (ALFA
Case Nos. NY-68-74 and NY-75-74) are
granted. The Employer shall credit
and pay Mr. O'Connor for the additional
hours of service and flight time and per
diem which he claims in those grievances.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Frank Foster
Concurring

Gerald Smallwood
Concurring

James Correa
Dissenting

Richard Elten
Dissenting
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DATED: July 26, 1975
STATE OF New York )c c •
COUNTY OF New York)
"
On this
26th
day of JulY 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

.

On this
day of
1975, before me personally
came and appeared Frank Foster and Gerald Smallwood to me known
and known to me to be the individuals described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and they acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York) " * "
On this
day of
1975, before me personally
came and appeared James Correa and Richard Elten to me known
and known to me to be the individuals described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and they acknowledged to me that
they executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

In the Matter of the Arbitration

'

between

'

System Council IBEW

'
'
'
i

and

ADMINISTER

AWARD
Case #13300865 73
;

Public Service Electric & Gas Company1

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly appointed
in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between
the above named parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of said parties makes the following AWARD:

1. Grievances 1084 and 1200 are denied.
2. Grievance 1071 is denied.
3. Grievance 1068: The ten (10) day
disciplinary suspension of Robert
Eltringham is reduced to a disciplinary
reprimand. He shall be made whole for
the time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
Dudley Allen
Concurring in #1 &
#2 dissenting from

Alfred W. Giles
Concurring in #3
dissenting from
#1 and #2
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DATED: August
, 1973
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of August, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

On this
day of August, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Dudley Allen to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of August, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Alfred W. Giles to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
System Council IBEW

OPINION of CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 0865 71

and
Public Service Electric & Gas Company

The Undersigned was appointed as Chairman of a tripartite
Board of Arbitration to hear and decide the disputes involved in
grievances 1084, 1200, 1071 and 1068.

(Grievance 1093 was

settled and withdrawn from arbitration during the course of the
hearings).
Messrs. Alfred W. Giles and Dudley Allen served respectively as the Union and Company members of the Board of Arbitration
Hearings were held on September 20, November 1, November
15, and December 13, 1972.

Representatives of the Union and

Company appeared and full opportunity was afforded all concerned
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Oath of the Arbitrators' was expressly waived.

The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on July 5, 1973.
Grievances 1084 and 1200 (which the parties agreed to
treat as one ) are denied.

Considering the nature, requirements

and quality of the disputed work, the descriptions of the job
classifications in question, the past practices of the parties
in connection with that type of work, the settlement of prior
relevant grievances and disputes, and the fact that the classifica
tion Utility Man is the successor to Mechanical Utility Helper

-2(and other Helpers), I conclude that the painting work in
dispute was "unskilled" and properly assigned to Utility Men.
Grievance 1071 is denied. I conclude that Robert Brown
was "hired" as of September 24, 1970 to the extent that the
Utility Man job for which he was selected was thereafter no
longer open or available to be filled pursuant to subsequent
postings. That Brown started work not before October 8, 1970
does not constitute either a willful or inadvertant circumvention
or violation of Article IV Section F of the contract and did not
improperly deprive any employee applicants, who responded to the
October 1st posting (or those subsequent) of appointment to
that job classification. In short, I find that the vacancy for
which Brown was hired on September 24, 1970 was no longer open
on October 1st, even though Brown did not actually commence
work until October 8th.
It is noted that the Company did not delay Brown's report
ing to work. On the contrary, Brown requested a two week deferral
from September 24th to October 8th because of difficulties in
moving his family. The Company granted his request for this
bonafide reason, with the obvious and logical attendant understanding that the job would be kept available for him until
October 8th.
Also, his seniority commenced as of October 8th, not
September 24th. Hence the Company neither instigated nor was
responsible for Brown's two week delay in reporting for work
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but rather accommodated him, pursuant to his request and accorded
him a proper seniority date consistent with the date he began
work.
Had the circumstances been different - had the Company
ordered the delay in Brown's reporting date or granted him
seniority rights from an earlier date, or had it authorized or
been responsible for circumstances which could be construed as
designed to or having the effect of circumventing or violating
the contract, whether purposeful or not, I would have had no
hesitancy in according the employee(s) adversely affected a
higher seniority date in the job classification, as requested
herein by the Union. Consequently

this decision is based on

the particular facts of this case, and cannot be deemed precedential for any future matters.
Grievance 1068. The ten (10) day suspension of Robert
Eltringham is reduced to a disciplinary reprimand.
because I condone the grievant's actions.

I do so not

On the contrary, he

manifestly over-stepped the bounds of his role as a union
official in a highly dangerous and intemperate manner.
instructions

His

and exhortations to fellow employees, in response

to the Company's decision to search vehicles, could have incited
to violence, and injury, if not worse.

But I find that the

Company by dealing with the grievant (in his capacity as a union
official) in an unorthodox and irregular manner initiated and
directly contributed to the circumstances and atmosphere that
caused the grievant's outburst.

-4I do not see the instant circumstances as similar to an
ordinary disciplinary or investigative case, where a union
steward is asked to observe an employee engaged in misconduct,
or to be present when a penalty is imposed.

The search of

vehicles, whether "voluntary" or not, is a controversial
procedure which generates opposition, excitement and adversariness
Here, the Company significantly heightened the problem by not
telling the grievant what it intended to do or what he was requested to observe until the very last moment.

And then only

after he had accompanied Company representatives to a point in
the parking lot where the search announcement was made.

As I

see it, the Company put the grievant in a position where it would
of
appear to other employees that he knew/or condoned, or even was
participating in the search.
Also, though the Company may have had reasonable grounds
to do so, I can appreciate how the grievant may have felt "used"
if not denigrated by not being told earlier that the Company
planned to search vehicles, and that his presence for that
purpose was needed. For the Company to involve him in so controversial a precedure without that prior notice, I deem to be
provocative and a proximate cause of his outburst.

In short,

I consider the way the Company handled the grievant as a union
official to be both incongruous with regular labor-management
methods and unfair.
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That the other Union officials who were present at the
two locations where the vehicle searches were made voiced their
objections in a restrained and responsible manner means only that
the grievant acted wrongly, not that he should bear the full
blame for how he reacted. When provoked or when felt to have
been unfairly dealt with, people react differently. The grievant
acted improperly and is not excused. But I doubt he would have
been so extreme had the Company been free of contributory blame.
This conclusion makes the full ten (10) day suspension
insupportable. A full exoneration of the grievat is equally
unwarranted. The options are a lesser suspension or a reprimand.
On balance I deem the latter more appropriate.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
t

System Council U-2, IBEW

'
'
'

and

Award
of
Arbitrators

1

Public
_ _ _ _ Service
_ _ _ _ _Electric
_ _ _ _ &
_ Gas
_ _ Co.
_ „ _ _ _ '
!
The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated May 1, 1971, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award as
follows:
1. Grievance #74-1972-18 is arbitrable
2. Grievance #74-1972-18 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Alfred W. Giles
Union Arbitrator
Concurring in #1
Dissenting from #2

Thomas H. Johnson
Company Arbitrator
Dissenting from #1
Concurring in #2
DATED: July
1974
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York) " " "
On this
day of July, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED: July
1974
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ' ' !
On this
day of July, 1974 before me personally came
and appeared Alfred W. Giles to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED: July
1974
STATE OF New York )c o
COUNTY OF New York)fa

•

On this
day of July, 1974 before me personally came
and appeared Thomas H. Johnson to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 1330 1036 73

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
System Council U-2, IBEW
Opinion

and

of
Chairman

Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 1, 1971 between
Public Service Electric & Gas Co., hereinafter referred to as
the "Company," and System Council U-2, IBEW, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as
the Chairman of a tri-partite Board of Arbitration to hear and
decide a dispute between the Union and the Company involving
the Union's grievance #74-1972-18.

Messrs. Alfred W. Giles

and Thomas H. Johnson served respectively as the Union and
Company designees on the Board of Arbitration.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on April 1, 1974 at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties filed post hearing briefs

and the Board of Arbitration met in executive session on July
15, 1974.
I reject the Company's contention that the issue is not
arbitrable, but I deny the Union's grievance on the merits.
The decision of the majority of the Board of Arbitration
In the Matter of the Arbitration between System Counci.1 U-2,
IBEW and Public Service Electric & Gas Co., AAA #1330 1036 73

- 2 is applicable to and dispositive of the instant arbitrability
issue.

Accordingly for the reasons and with the conditions set

forth in the Chairman's Opinion in that cited case, the instant
grievance #74-1972-18 is arbitrable.
On the merits I find that the disputed clerical work assigned to Servicemen Specialists on the midnight to 8 A.M. shift in
the Jersey City District is an "incidental" part of that job
classification within the meaning of item 3, page 2 of the Preamble to the Job Specifications, namely "performing the paper
work required in connection with that job."
One of the undisputed functions of the Serviceman Specialist is to replace aged gas meters.

It is also undisputed that

incidental to that assignment, Servicemen Specialists (also
called Dispatchers) regularly made telephone appointments with
customers to be sure they would be home when the meter was to
be changed.

The instant disputed work, namely addressing envel-

opes or written communications to customers for the same purpose, is, in my view, nothing more than a procedural variation
of the work the Serviceman Specialist has been performing all
along in communicating with customers he serves.

Hence I deem

it to be paper work ... "in connection with that job" within
the meaning of item 3 page 2 of the incidental job functions enumerated in the Preamble to the Job Specifications.
I agree with the Union that the Company made this assignment (which previously was performed by light duty personnel
of various classifications including Servicemen Specialists)
for economical reasons, especially to fill out the work shift

- 3 of Servicemen Specialists on the midnight to 8 A.M. shift where
those employees had not been fully occupied.

But in doing so,

I find that the Company made an assignment which is directly related to the duties of that classification (i.e. arranging for anc
replacing meters) and which is not materially different in purpose and objective from the work those employees have regularly
performed in communicating with customers.

And there is no ques-

tion that they, as well as employees classified as Clerks are
fully capable of performing this type of work.

Accordingly the

Union's grievance #74-1972-18 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
i
'
T

System Council U-2 IBEW
and
Public Service Gas & Electric Company

'
'
'

Award of
Arbitrators

'

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated May 1, 1973, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, Award as
follows:
1) Union grievances 1100 and 1230 are granted.
Messrs. Curran and Kertesz should have been
promoted pursuant to their respective bids.
Curran who has since been promoted shall be
made whole for the difference in wages.
Kertesz shall be promoted and shall be made
whole for the difference in wages.
2) Union grievance 1139 is granted. Grievant
Klima should have been promoted to Chief
Stockman. Inasmuch as he has since been promoted to that job he shall be made whole for
the difference in wages.
3) Union grievances 1136 and 1157 are arbitrable.
4) Union grievances 1136 and 1157 are denied.
The Company did not violate the Agreement in
connection with the contracting-out of overhead line work in Camden beginning September
1971 and in New Brunswick in January 1972.

r

/

Eric /J. Schmertz
Chairman

- 2 -

Alfred W. Giles
Concurring in #1, #2 and #3
Dissenting from #4

George H. Barnstorf
Concurring in #4
Dissenting from #1, #2 and #3
DATED: April
1974
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
day of April, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:April
1974
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
day of April, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Alfred W. Giles to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED: April 1974
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
day of April, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared George H. Barnstorf to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 1291 73

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
System Council U-2 IBEW

'
i
'
'
1

Opinion of
Chairman

'
i

and
Public Service Gas & Electric Company

'

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 1, 1973 between
Public Service Electric & Gas Company, hereinafter referred
to as the "Company," and System Council U-2 IBEW, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated
as Chairman of a tri-partite Board of Arbitration to hear and
decide disputes relating to grievances 1100, 1230, 1139, 1136
and 1157.

Messrs. George H. Barnstorf and Alfred W. Giles

served respectively as the Company and Union members of the
Board of Arbitration.

Hearings were held on January 7 and 9,

1974 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
Board of Arbitration met in executive session on April 9, 1974,

Grievances 1100 and 1230
Because the contract issue is the same, these two grievances were tried together and a single ruling will be dispositive of both.

The stipulated issues are:

1100) Did the Company violate the Agreement by
denying W. Curran a promotion to Automotive Mechanic Grade 1 on January 1, 1971?
1230) Did the Company violate Article IV E2a
or Article IV Section V of the Agreement
by denying J. Kertesz the promotion to
Truck Driver - Winch Truck on May 5, 1972?

- 2 When the grievants bid for the promotions referred to in
the respective issues, they were not accorded credit in the
calculation of their seniority for the period of time that
each had earlier spent in those particular jobs.

Curran had

worked as an Automotive Mechanic Grade 1 for 9 years, 10
months and 6 days from July 3, 1959 to May 4, 1969.

Kertesz

worked as a Truck Driver - Winch Truck for 8 years and 1 month
from August 14, 1959 to September 15, 1967.
I conclude that the Company's refusal to accord the
grievants seniority credit for the periods of time they previously worked in those jobs was violative of Article IV E2a
of the contract.

That Section reads in pertinent part;

"For promotions to all job classifications within the bargaining unit ....seniority shall govern."
Seniority is defined by Article IV B.

In pertinent

part that Section reads:
"Length of service in each classification within an occupational group .... shall be known
as 'seniority.'"
It is undisputed that the jobs of Automotive Mechanic
Grade 1 and Truck Driver - Winch Truck are "classifications"
within the meaning of Article IV B.

Also there is no dis-

pute about the ability of the grievants to respectively perform the jobs in question.
I fail to see why each grievant was not given credit
for his length of service, previously acquired in each of the
classifications to which they subsequently sought to return.
Article r?. B places no conditions or restrictions on

- 3 the "length of service" acquired in the classification.

It

does not exclude periods of time which are broken by subsequent
service in other jobs nor does it provide for the loss of seniority acquired from service in a classification by subsequent
tr ansfer to or work in some other job or classification. Hence
I find no basis upon which the grievants were properly denied
seniority credit for their prior periods of service in the
classifications Automotive Mechanic and Truck Driver - Winch
Truck.
Accordingly, in applying Article IVE the provision that
"seniority shall govern" must per force include all the service
time they acquired in those classifications.

Therefore the

Company erred when it did not include that credit in calculating the grievants' seniority in considering their respective
bids.

It is undisputed that if those periods of seniority were

included, both grievants would have been promoted.

Subsequent-

ly Curran was promoted to the Automotive Mechanic Grade 1
classification.

Therefore he shall be made whole for wages

lost for the period of time from which his bid should have been
accepted to the date that he was promoted.
Kertesz has not been promoted.

Accordingly he shall be

promoted to the classification Truck Driver - Winch Truck and
shall be made whole in wages for the period of time from which
his bid should have been accepted to the date he is promoted.

Grievance 1139
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the Agreement when it
selected Frank MacDonald for the Chief Stockman
vacancy on August 13, 1971?

- 4 This issue requires an interpretation of the following
portion of the jointly negotiated "qualifications" language
of the Chief Stockman job description:
"Must have had at least 3 years experience as
Stockman or Stockman-Driver or the equivalent"
(emphasis added).
I am persuaded that the foregoing language should not be
interpreted to accord preference in a bidding situation to a
junior employee who has more experience than a more senior
bidder, where the greater experience was acquired in similar
or related work with a different employer and not within this
bargaining unit.
In the instant case MacDonald was with the Company only
18 months, but had worked for upwards of 38 years as Chief
Stockman for another employer.

The Company deemed this outside

experience preeminent in awarding him the Chief Stockman job
over the grievant (Mr. Klima).

Yet Klima had greater senior-

ity and he met the minimum experience requirements, namely more
than 3 years experience as Stockman-Driver within this bargaining unit.
It seems to me that the Company's interpretation is incongruous with the general contractual provisions that "seniority shall govern ...." especially where, as here, the grievant met the minimum qualifications.

To accept the Company's

interpretation would mean that a bargaining unit employee with
greater seniority, who meets the minimum qualifications set
forth in the job description, would lose out to a newer

em-

ployee who had acquired greater related experience elsewhere.

- 5 I cannot accept this interpretation not only because of
contractual limitations, but because I think it runs counter
to the traditional intent and spirit of the collective bargaining relationship,(i.e. job protection, seniority, the integrity
of the bargaining unit, etc).

It seems to me that if the Com-

pany's version was intended, the parties would and should have
been more specific in defining the meaning of the phrase "or
the equivalent.1' Absent a more specific definition, I am constrained to conclude that that phrase relates to equivalent
experience acquired either within the bargaining unit or in a
manner and of a type which does not result in permitting a
qualified senior employee to be jumped by a junior employee in
a job bidding situation.
Accordingly I interpret the disputed language in one of
the ways advanced by the Union, namely that the phrase "or
equivalent" may be resorted to only if there is no senior bargaining unit employee with the specific qualifications required.

In other words if a senior bidder does not possess at

least 3 years experience as a Stockman or Stockman-Driver, the
Company may then consider the equivalent experience of that
bidder or equivalent experience of other bidders acquired in
other jobs within this bargaining unit or under the other circumstances previously referred to.

But where, as here, the

senior bidder, grievant Klima, met the threshold experience requirement, namely more than 3 years experience as a StockmanDriver, the Company had no right to bypass him by accepting
the greater, but outside equivalent experience of MacDonald.

- 6 This is not a reversal of a prior decision of Arbitrator
Milton Friedman.

In deciding his case Mr. Friedman dealt

with a distinction between quantitative and qualitative experience acquired within this bargaining unit. His view regarding circumstances under which outside factors could be
utilized to meet the equivalency test was dicta, and not in
specific answer to the issue before him.
Nor am I persuaded by the Company's distinction between
the "qualifications" language of the Chief Stockman job description and the somewhat different "qualifications" language of other job descriptions such as that of Radio-Operator •
Mechanic.

I believe the differences arose because the job

descriptions were negotiated at different times and for reasons unique to the particular jobs involved.
I consider it too strained to infer that because some
other job descriptions such as Radio Operator Mechanic allow
the Company to consider "equivalency" only if there are no
applicants to meet the minimum specified qualifications based
on bargaining unit experience, the different language of the
Stockman description therefore allows a competitive relationship between an applicant who meets the minimum qualifications
and other applicants, including those less senior who possessed equivalent or more equivalent experience from a different employment relationship.

I think an acceptance of that

inference is so contrary to the traditional collective bargaining relationship and the benefits traditionally accorded
qualified employees in promotional situations, as to require
more specific contract language to achieve the result which
the Company seeks herein.

- 7 Accordingly the Company violated the contract when it
selected MacDonald rather than Klima for the position of Chief
Stockman.

Klima was subsequently promoted to Chief Stockman.

Accordingly for the period of time between August 13, 1971 and
the date that he was promoted, he shall be made whole for the
difference in wages.
Grievances 1136 and 1157
These two grievances involve the same contract section,
were tried together, and a single ruling shall be dispositive
of both.
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the Agreement by employing contractors to perform overhead line
work in Camden beginning in September, 1971
and in New Brunswick in January 1972?
The issue is arbitrable because it involves the application and interpretation of Article VN2 of the contract which
reads:
"The Company and the Union shall abide by the
'Award of Arbitrator1 and 'Opinion of Arbitrator1 dated December 15, 1944, made by Arbitrator George W. Alger, concerning contracting-out
work customarily performed by employees within
the bargaining unit."
In the instant proceeding the Union seeks an Award directing the Company to give adequate prior notice to the Union
at the Corporate-System Council level of work to be contracted out, to afford the Union a realistic opportunity to argue
against the plan and to propose alternatives which would
keep the work within the bargaining unit.

- 8 The instant grievances do not allege that the work of the
contractors at the locations and times set forth in the stipulated issue deprived bargaining unit employees "from receiving
employment in the various forms of employment in which they are
customarily engaged" within the meaning of that language in
Arbitrator Alger's Award and Opinion.

So the grievances are

confined to whether or not the Company has a contractual obligation to provide the Union with the type and manner of prior
notice which the Union seeks.
Of necessity, an interpretation of Article VN2 requires
an interpretation of the Alger Award and Opinion.

The Award

makes no mention of "notice" so the Award has not been violated.
But the Opinion does deal with the question of notice.
Mr. Alger made a recommendation.

He stated

"The policy of consultation with the Union on
larger matters involving contracting out of
work is desirable, has been followed in the
past and proved helpful to the employer as
well as to the Union. This course, to be sure
is not required by the contract
This
policy was not pursued in the present instance.
I recommend its use, even though it is not required by the contract, in future dealings between the Union and the Employer before making
contracts for work which might be done by the
present staff. The ultimate decision, of course,
is a matter for the employer, and doubtless on
many smaller matters consultation would prove
time wasting and not feasible."
In my judgment the reference in Article VN2 to the
"Opinion of Arbitrator" means, so far as the instant issue is
concerned, that the Company agrees to continue to consider the
Alger recommendation in this regard, and that that recommendation includes by its terms the Company's right to utilize

- 9 or not utilize it.

Therefore the Company is not bound to and

has not contractually agreed to consult with the Union prior
to making contracting-out contracts.

It has agreed to no more

than what Mr. Alger recommended, namely that it will consider
consulting with or giving notice to the Union prior to making
contracting-out contracts, but whether or not it does so is a
matter for it alone to decide.
That being so, the Union's interpretation herein is rejected and the Union's claim that Article VN2 requires prior consultation and/or notice on the Corporate-System Council level
is denied.

However, the Company should do no less than pres-

ent practice, i.e. the practice of giving enough notice where
there is to be contracting-out of significant work to allow the
Union sufficient time to suggest to the Company alternative
methods of retaining work within the bargaining unit.

But

this practice has not been followed and as Mr. Alger stated is
not applicable in a contracting-out situation where notice and
consultation "would prove time wasting and not feasible."

Eric J./Schmertz
Chairman

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 58 International Brotherhood
of Firemen and Oilers, AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #74-975

and
Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator under
the Arbitration Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of John Davis is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall
be reinstated without back pay. The
period between the date of his discharge
and his reinstatement shall be a disciplinary suspension for his unsatisfactory
attendance record. He is warned that in
the opinion of this Arbitrator, if he does
not attain and maintain a satisfactory
attendance record within the next two months
and thereafter the Company would have just
cause to discharge him summarily.

Eric
Arbtrator
DATED: November 20, 1975
STATE OF: New York )sg.
COUNTY OF : Tl
On this twentieth day of November, 1975, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

VALERIE R. HANSEW
Notary Public, State of New Yort
r No. 30-4519031
Qualified in Nassau County
Term Expires March 30.

T7 "3
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IBPS & PMW, Hyman Gordon Local 107
AFL-CIO
AWARD

and
Revere Copper & Brass Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated September 4, 1969 and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The discharge of Johnny Browning was for just cause.

Eric /J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of February, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 1049 71

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IBPS & PMW, Hytnan Gordon Local 107
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION

Revere Copper & Brass Corporation

In accordance with Article III Section 3 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated September 4, 1969 between
Revere Copper & Brass Corporation, Foil Division, hereinafter
referred to as the "Division," and Hyman Gordon, Local 107
International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill
Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
the following stipulated issue:
Did the Division discharge the grievant, Johnny
Browning on or about September 8, 1971 for just
cause under the Agreement?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on January 12, 1972 at which time Mr.
Browning, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Division, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
The grievant was discharged because of excessive absenteeism and lateness.

On numerous occasions over a two year per-

iod prior to the discharge, he was warned, and at the end of
July, 1971 he received a one week disciplinary

suspension.

Under the facts presented and in view of the express provisions of Article X Section 2(d) of the Agreement, I have no

- 2 choice but to sustain the discharge.
The grievant's record of absenteeism and lateness over
more than a two year period from June 1969 to early September
1971, has been undisputedly excessive and therefore need not
be recited in detail.

The sole question is whether the cir-

cumstance which gave rise to that record, namely his wife's
illness is sufficiently compelling to vitiate the discharge
and, as mandated by Article X Section 2(d) to restore the
grievant to work with back pay.

As no doubt the parties knew

when they negotiated that clause, Article X Section 2(d) precludes the Arbitrator from mitigating a discharge if he believes that the penalty of discharge, though generally applicable to the offense involved, ought to be reduced to a disciplinary suspension because of special circumstances.
The grievant's discharge fits within the well settled general rule regarding excessive absenteeism and lateness.

Dis-

charge is a proper penalty when, following the imposition of
lesser penalties pursuant to a "progressive discipline" formula,
an offending employee's chronic record of absenteeism and lateness remains unsatisfactory.

And this is true even if his

failure to report to work regularly and on time is due to circumstances beyond his control or fault„

The ruling is based

on the equally well recognized proposition that an employer is
entitled to regular and prompt attendance by his employees in
order to meet production and service requirements and need not
retain an employee who cannot work regularly, no matter what
the reason for his difficulty.

- 3 The instant case meets that test.

For an extended per-

iod of time despite warnings and a disciplinary suspension,
the grievant's record of absenteeism and lateness continued
at an unreasonably high level.

That it was in part at least

beyond his fault or control is not an exception to the rule;
and therefore a matter to be considered in mitigation only by
the Division, not the Arbitrator.
But the particular circumstances in this case while in
no way changing my Award, impel me to make a recommendation
to the Division; a step I rarely take.

It appears that a sig-

nificant amount of the grievant's unsatisfactory attendance
record was due not to misconduct or negligence but to the illness of his wife and the need that he remain home to care for
his child.

If this was a present and continuing condition I

would not venture to recommend an alternative remedy to the
Division.

But the grievant testified, and I believe honestly,

that this has now abated.

Though his wife remains ill, he has

located a responsible person to care for the child while he is
at work.

One of the principal obstacles to regular and prompt

attendance may now be overcome.

Or in other words, there is

reason to believe that the chronic pattern of the grievant's
poor attendance record can now be broken.

It seems to me that

in view of the unfortunate personal difficulties which the
grievant has experienced, and which are unrebutted in the
record, the Company should give him a final opportunity to
demonstrate that he can now meet the obligation? of his job.
Accordingly I recommend that the Company reinstate him

- 4without back pay; treat the period of time between his discharge and return to work as a disciplinary suspension for excessive absenteeism and lateness; and give him a three month
period within which to dramatically improve his attendance
record.

If, in the judgment of the Division, within that per-

iod of time or any time thereafter, the grievant's attendance
record remains unsatisfactory

or resumes its unsatisfactory

nature, he would be subject to summary discharge.
This recommendation does not alter my Award.

Obviously,

it is discretionary with the Division to accept the recommendation in lieu of the Award.

Absent the willingness of the

Division to do so, the Award upholding the discharge stands.

Eric jT/ychmertz
Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

AWARD

and

Scotchwood Quality Services, Inc

The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator in the collective bargaining agreement between the above named Union and
Employer, renders the following AWARD based on the evidence
presented at a duly noticed and scheduled hearing of April
8, 1975:

For the period August 1974 through December 1974
Scotchwood Quality Services, Inc. is delinquent in
payment to and owes the Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702 Pension Fund the sum of
four thousand two hundred ninety six dollars and
sixty cents ($4296.60).
For the period August 1974 through December 1974
Scotchwood Quality Services, Inc. is delinquent in
payment to and owes the Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702 Welfare Fund the sum of
three thousand six hundred fifty six dollars and
sixty-nine cents ($3656.69).
Scotchwood Quality Services, Inc. is directed to pay
said sums to said Funds forthwith with interest at
67o per annum.

^
April yi97 5

Eric J/Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ss:>
COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) "
On this
f
day of April 1975, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foreging instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 804 I.B.T.

OPINION AND

and

AWARD

W^cJ.Slaone, Inc.

CASE NUMBER:

1330 0030 75

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
AH
-HE

UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR??), having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
A p r i l 1, 1974
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

I conclude that Article VI, Section B permits the Company to
promulgate a rule requiring employees to complete an "explanation
of absence form". The Company's determination that its action
was "necessary and proper for the conduct of its business" has
been adequately shown and was not unreasonable or unrelated to
the meaning of that phrase in Section B. There is no real dispute
that one important factor in the efficient operation of the
Company's business (delivering furniture to customers) is the full
and regular attendance of its employees. It has been shown that
absenteeism has been a problem; that the bonafides of each absence
may be taken out of dispute by the use of the form; and that since
its introduction attendance has improved. I agree with the Union
that the form and/or parts thereof may be unnecessary to the Company's
right to discipline for poor attendance. However with the contract
right to promulgate such a rule for the "necessary and proper conduct
of its business", whether it is ordinarily necessary for discipline
is immaterial. Here however, the form may "cut both ways". By
requiring particularization of absences it may not only establish for
the Company the reason for a particular absence and the circumstances
thereof, but may be protective to the employees by relieving them
of liability for, or removing from their cummulative records, absences
that are legitimate. The Union's grievance is denied.
Arbitrator's signature (dated)

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
came and appeared

ss.

5 th
day of
May
Eric J. Schmertz

, 1 9 '5, before me personally

to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA-24M.11-71

COMMON WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

In The Matter of The Fact Finding
between
Transport Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO and Transport Workers Union
of Philadelphia, Local 234, AFL-CIO
and

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority, City Transit Division

OPINION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
OF
FACT FINDER
Case No. PERA-FF-5332-E

Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Transport
Workers Union of Philadelphia, Local 234, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union" and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, City Transit Division, hereinafter referred
to as "SEPTA" have been unable as yet to directly negotiate a
full collective bargaining agreement to succeed the current
contract.
In accordance with the Public Employee Relations Act
(No. 195) of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the Undersigned
was designated as the fact finder to hear and make recommendations
on the unresolved contract issues between the Union and SEPTA.
Hearings were held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on
February 10, 23 and 24, 1975, at which time representatives of
the Union and SEPTA, hereinafter referred to jointly as "the
parties", appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The parties filed post hearing briefs.

-2Certain contract issues the parties reserved to themselves
for further negotiations.

Those issues were not submitted to the

fact finder and are not recited herein.

The issues submitted to

the fact finder, upon which evidence and testimony were adduced
are:
Union Proposals
1. A wage increase of $2.25 per hour across the
board effective March 15, 1975, protected by a
cost of living clause.
2.

A one year contract.

3. (a) Existing Blue Cross-Blue Shield coverage
to be expanded to include optical, drugs and dental
benefits.
(b) Blue Cross-Blue Shield provisions to be
expanded to cover early retirees, disabled retirees and spouses.
(c) Special Blue Cross provision for member
and spouse after 65.
4. (a) Sick benefit payments to be increased to
$125 a week for 200 days beginning with the second
day, with present restrictions on the filing date
removed.
(b) Alcoholism to be defined as a compensable
illness.
(c) Full pay for time lost due to job related
injury.
5. Life insurance to be increased to $10,000 without reduction for retirees.
6. Four additional holidays, with all holidays
worked to be paid at double time plus one days pay.
7. Clothing and tool allowance to be increased from
$125 to $175.
8. (a) One-half pay pension after 25 years of service
regardless of age with pension to continue to surviving
beneficiary.
(b) Five years of service to qualify for total disability pension at full pension amount.

-3(c) Pensions of existing retirees to be
increased by cost of living adjustment.
(d) Increase in severance pay to $150.
9.

Vacations:
Two weeks after one year.
Three weeks after three years.
Four weeks after eight years.
Five weeks after fifteen years.
Six weeks after twenty years.

10. Night Premium:
10% night premimum from 6 P.M. to 6 A.M.
Monday through Thursday.
107o night premium from 6 P.M. Friday to
6 A.M. Monday.
11. Meal allowance to be increased to $3 and
accident report allowance increased to $2; both
allowances paid immediately in cash. SEPTA to
pay complete cost of stolen tools.
12. SEPTA passes to be valid on all SEPTA operated
lines excluding Penn Central and Reading Railroads.
13. Thirty (30) minutes paid lunch period for
cashiers.
14. Except as agreed upon in the current negotiations the provisions of the prior agreement continue
in full force and effect.
SEPTA Proposals
1. The contract to extend for a period of three
(3) years, terminating midnight March 14, 1978.
2.

The right to hire part-time workers.

3. An employee who works on one of his regularly
scheduled days off will be paid at the overtime
rate (time and half time) only if he has successfully completed his work assignments for his
regularly scheduled work days in that particular
work week. If he has not he will be paid at the
regular straight time rate.

-44. All work performed within a specific week
by an extra person will be credited against
the minimum weekly wage guaranteed for that week.
5. The Union recognizes the principle that it is
a sound economic and social objective to produce
more without the necessity of increasing the labor
force.
6. Transporation operators hired on March 15th,
1975, and thereafter, will receive for the first
year of service $.75 per hour less than the
operator's top rate.
For the second year of service $.50 per hour
less than the operator's top rate.
For the third year of service $.25 per hour
less than the operator's top rate.
After the third year of service they will
receive the regular operator's top rate.
The record before the fact finder is voluminuous, consisting of some 113 exhibits, extensive testimony and comprehensive
briefs.

It is one of the most complete and detailed cases pre-

sented to him in his many years as an arbitrator, fact finder and
mediator.

The research, preparation, documentation and presenta-

tion of the cases of both sides are of the highest quality.

The

personnel responsible for that work are commended for the
professional excellence demonstrated.
As I hope the parties recognize, the time between the close
of the hearings and the deadline for rendition of these recommendations has been too short for the fact finder to write an extension recitation and appraisal of the arguments and evidence
advanced by the parties on each of the issues.

Suffice it to say

that the full record has been studied intensively, and as required by the Public Employee Relations Act No. 195, the findings
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of fact and recommendations are based upon "reliable and credible
evidence produced at the hearings."
Accordingly

I have limited this report to my recommenda-

tions on the issues (separately or in combination) together
with a short or relatively concise statement setting forth the
essential facts upon which the recommendations are based.

On

the matter of wages, concerning which, understandably, the
parties devoted the bulk of their respective cases, I have
deemed it appropriate to recite in relatively brief form the
principal contentions of the parties.

And I have explained some

of the reasons behind my wage recommendation more fully than on
the other issues.

But because the parties are thoroughly

familiar with the details of their own positions and the positions
of each other, and because those positions are fully amplified
in the record, I consider unnecessary and more than time will
allow, to respond to each of the contentions and the facts advanced in support thereof, in the detailed and thorough manner
in which they were presented to me.
In synopsis form, the Union and SEPTA cases on the wage
issue are respectively as follows:
Union Position
The wages of the covered employees are significantly lower than comparable employees of the transit systems in Washington, Baltimore, Boston,
New York and Pittsburgh. Other public employees in
Philadelphia, particularly teachers and firemen,
compare favorably with those other cities (and are

-6ahead of some) whereas Philadelphia transit
workers lag substantially behind similar employees
of those cities. Wages of private sector employees
in Philadelphia compare favorably and have kept pace
with private sector employees in the other five
cities whereas Philadelphia transit workers lag behind their counterparts in those cities. Not only
is this wage discrepancy substantial but that since
1958 the gap has increased to the point where today
the bus operator's top rate in SEPTA is $1.20 an
hour below the average of those five cities.
Increases in the cost of living of over 23%70
in Philadelphia since the last negotiations has
eroded a substantial part of the wage increases
gained by the SEPTA employees in recent years.
An immediate wage increase of $1.20 an hour and a
further increase of $1 an hour is minimally essential
to recover the purchasing power eroded by inflation
and to slot SEPTA employees at a proper level with
those compared. That level thereafter during the contract term should be protected by a cost of living
escalator clause.
Based on BLS moderate standard of living budgets
for the five cities mentioned, the average annual
straight time wage of the transit operators in those
other five cities averages 91.3 percent of their
respective budgets whereas the wage of SEPTA employees
averages 73.6 percent of the moderate standard of
living budget for Philadelphia.
SEPTA's claim of inability to pay is immaterial.
The employees cannot be expected to subsidize SEPTA's
deficits. SEPTA, the appropriate public officials
and the legislative bodies have the duty to make funds
available to provide wages for SEPTA employees at a
decent level comparable to what others, similarly situated, earn, irrespective of SEPTA's financial difficulties
Distinguished fact finders in prior fact finding
proceedings between the parties and in other relevant
fact finding cases have enunciated that proposition,
especially (citing David L. Cole) "when the employees
are seeking to raise themselves from substandard to
standard conditions."

-7Philadelphia is a relatively high annual income
area ranking third after New York and Washington
among the five cities compared. Yet the wage rate of
the SEPTA bus operator for example, which ones ranked
with the best among those five cities is today 90^
an hour behind Baltimore, 87^ an hour behind Pittsburgh,
more than $1.13 an hour behind New York, more than $1.44
an hour behind Washington and more than $1.63 an hour
behind Boston; and that other covered SEPTA classifications are similarly disadvantaged.
SEPTA Position
The wages of SEPTA employees are already high,
productivity has declined, the economy has deteriorated and the City Transit Division has no funds
to pay for increased wages and benefits. In 1974
SEPTA's operating loss was more than 45 million
dollars compared to an operating loss of 34.5 million
in 1973. The trend is toward greater deficits with
a projected operating loss, before subsidy of 61.5
million for 1975. Whereas in 1961 the payroll and
fringes constituted 62 percent of its revenues,
labor costs last year amounted to a deficit producing 120.9 cents of every revenue dollar. Additional
sources of funds in the form of governmental subsidies
from the City of Philadelphia, from the Commonwealth
or under the Federal Mass Transportation Assistance
Act of 1974 are still indeterminative, but even if
anticipated subsidies are received they will erase
only a portion of projected operating losses. SEPTA
does not have the power to tax, the law prohibits
the transfer of money from any other division to the
City Transit Division (assuming such funds were available) . A fare increase to raise revenue is selfdefeating and counterproductive because it affects
those least able to pay and results in significant
reductions in ridership revenue. Indeed, after a
short period of increase due to the energy crisis,
ridership has resumed its fall-off with attendant
fare-box revenue losses. And this fall-off would have
been more pronounced but for the reduced fares for
senior citizens and the senior citizen subsidy. The
present recession with its increasing unemployment
descreases fare-box revenues and inhibits subsidies
from governmental bodies whose tax collections have
been sharply hit by the fall-off of the economy
generally.

-8Settlements over the past several years have
exceeded the rise in the consumer price index and
no additional wage increase is warranted. During
the period 1957-1959 to December, 1974, the SEPTA
hourly rate increased from $2.18 to $5.28 or 142.2
percent, while the consumer price index rose 85.9
percent. From 1967 to December, 1974, the hourly
rate increased 69.8 percent as compared to the
Philadelphia CPI increase of 59.2 percent. And
from December, 1968 to December, 1974, the hourly
rate increased 56.2 percent as compared to the CPI
rise of 48.6 percent. Considering these figures
there is no justification to the Union's "catch-up"
rationale.
The Union's comparison with the other five
cities mentioned is not meaningful. The economic
strength of the Delaware Valley region compares
unfavorably with that of the other localities.
New York for example has a significantly higher
per capita disposable income per year than Philadelphia.
And the financial base of the transit systems in
these cities vary tremendously as to the subsidies
they receive, the tax revenues made available to
them, or their assessment powers.
SEPTA rates compare favorably with the wage
rates and wage increases granted employees of the
City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Indeed SEPTA's employees fared
better in the years 1973 and 1974. Also a comparison
between the weekly earnings of SEPTA operators and
the weekly earnings of every industry in the Philadelphia
labor market area shows that SEPTA operators do
better, and that additionally they are guaranteed
a minimum weekly wage.
No increase in wages should be paid in light of
present economic conditions especially when the present
job guarantees of City Transit Division employees are
considered. A basic tenet of economics is that in
times of economic crisis, particularly when unemployment is high and jobs not readily available, demands

-9for higher wages and benefits for those who are
employed should disappear. SEPTA employees enjoy an unusual and highly valuable contract right,
in that after completion of one year of service
they are immune from layoff. This is a unique and
special benefit in the face of worsening economic
conditions, when unemployment is expected to go
over 107o nationwide and higher within the city of
Philadelphia. The value of both employment with
SEPTA and the protection from layoff is enhanced
by the fact that SEPTA receives considerably more
job applications than it has vacancies to fill.
An analysis of wage levels cannot ignore the
dollar value of fringe benefits. Fringe benefits
to SEPTA employees amount to approximately $2.30
an hour compared to a national average for industry
of $1.54, and this favorable comparison should be
included in comparing the total compensation of
SEPTA employees with others. Also the Union's comparison with five other major cities, all but one
of which is outside of Pennsylvania, ignores the
lower wage rates paid to employees in other eastern
Pennsylvania transit systems. Additionally SEPTA
wage scales should be compared with the general wage
levels in Philadelphia which have traditionally been
in the lower middle range.
Fact Finding and the Role of the Fact Finder
Of the two principal adjudicatory methods available for the
resolution of contract terms, the Public Employee Relations Act
No. 195 provides for fact finding with advisory, non-binding
recommendations rather than arbitration with mandatory finality.
That process was acceptable to me when I was originally asked to
serve and it remains acceptable.

The fact finding process and

the role of the fact finder differ subtly but significantly from
that of the arbitrator.

Neutrals and practitioners are not in

full accord on the scope of the role of the fact finder as compared to that of the arbitrator, but I have definite views on

-10that subject.

Like the arbitrator, the fact finder must make

judgements on the merits of the issue in dispute.

But unlike

the arbitrator for whom it may be unnecessary because of his
authority to impose a determination, the fact finder must also
give important attention to what he judges will be acceptable
to both sides.

I interpret the statute as calling upon the fact

finder to assist the parties in completing their contract by
making recommendations for the settlement of the unresolved
issues.

The statute would be meaningless or largely

ineffectual

if it did not have that purpose and objective in mind.

I con-

strue the statute to mean that the legislature and the affected
parties want recommendations for settlement or recommendations
that will provide a framework for a settlement with some further
negotiations.

What is not wanted in my judgement, are recommend-

ations for non-settlement or recommendations which, in the view
of the fact finder will be rejected by either or both.

As I see

it the fact finder's role may require consideration of facts
beyond what may be required in an arbitration; to fashion recommendations that are not only fair, reasonable, responsible
and meritorious but also recommendations which both sides can
accept or with which both can live.

The fact finder, under this

statute, is an aid to the direct collective bargaining process.
He is asked to assist the parties in doing for them what they
were not fully able to do for themselves - to recommend substantive

-11terms for the completion of their contract.

As such he should

consider as a "fact" to be determined, what in his best judgement
the parties would or should have negotiated had they been able
to do so directly.

Related to this, the fact finder is asked

to help avert a strike.

Therefore a relevant "fact" before him

is how in his judgement the parties should have settled their
disputes through direct bargaining to avert a strike.
It would be salutory and of course determinative if these
responsibilities of the fact finder and these objectives neatly
coincided with his findings or views on the bare evidentiary
merits of the issues.

Then, there would be no need for the fact

finder to go further.

But if, based on his experience in this

kind of process, his sensitivity to the realistic dynamics of
the collective bargaining process, and his recognition of the
influences and interests that work on both sides, the fact finder
concludes that findings on the bare merits of the issues will not
settle the dispute and will not be acceptable to either or both
sides, should his judgement on what it will take to achieve a
settlement and acceptability be disregarded? I think not.

To-

gether with all other material facts, the "fact" of what is
conservatively needed for a settlement is as much a key fact as
any other.

In that event, in my view, an adjustment in the bare
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merits of the issue to accommodate the requirements of settlement is not only what the parties and the public should want,
but best serves the purposes and intent of the statute and the
fact finding process, provided of course that the adjustments
are fair, reasonable and conscionable.

In my experience, be-

tween the bare merits of the issue on the one hand and unwarrantec
adjustments therein on the other, there is sufficient ground to
accommodate modifications that are not unduly or unreasonably
burdensome and which square with "reliable and credible evidence",
but which may be necessary to achieve the principal objective
of settlement.

In short I do not believe in fact finding for

settlement's sake regardless of the terms, but rather fact
finding which, because the recommendations meet the basic needs
and abilities of the parties in a fair, equitable and responsible
manner within the collective bargaining setting, offers greater
assurance of acceptance and settlement on decent terms.
Within the foregoing context certain observations and
findings of fact, principally on the wage issue, warrant discussion
Manifestly, in the view of the fact finder there is no
absolute right or wronge on the wage issue, and in large measure
the problems which both sides face are not of their making and are
beyond their control.

The parties have been the victims of the
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cross and mutually inconsistent influences of a national if not
international economic phenomena of simultaneous inflation and
recession.

Spiralling inflation over the past contract term

has eroded a significant part of the purchasing power of the
wage increase which the employees gained through collective
bargaining.

And with a present indication of only a relatively

minor abatement in the period ahead, the actual and anticipated
increases in basic living costs adds legitimate thrust to the
demands of the employees, not only for a wage increase but for
some protection this time against the effects of the inflationary
impact on their real earnings.
Conversely SEPTA's ability to pay such increases though not
determinative, is nonetheless quite relevant.

The recession,

coupled with increased costs for fuel, equipment, parts, new
buses and other operating facilities has compounded SEPTA1s
deficit status.

SEPTA operates more in the red or projects its

operations more in the red with each passing year.
are insufficient.

Fare revenues

SEPTA and the Union agree that a fare increase

would be imprudent and counterproductive, by over-burdening those
who must rely on the transit system and who are least able to
bear the increase - namely low and moderate income citizens and
senior citizens.

It is agreed that the inevitable

consequence

of a fare increase would be to reduce the number of riders using
the system with a corresponding decrease in fare revenues.

The

fact finder is in full accord with this view and would not, even
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if he had the authority to do so, recommend a fare increase.

In short I deem material to the determinations and recommendations which I must make the following juxtaposed set
of seemingly conflicting facts; the inflationary affects on
real wages, and ability to pay; the legitimate right of employees
to wage increases and a wage scale comparable with others similarly employed elsewhere, and SEPTA1s limited resources for additional revenues and subsidies; the relatively favorable position
of SEPTA employees compared with the Philadelphia labor market
generally, and the unfavorable status of SEPTA1s employees compared with transit employees of other major cities; and the
recessionary effect on the ability of the public treasury to
increase subsidies, and

the duty of public officials and bodies

to maintain essential transit services with competitive wage
scales and other benefits for the employees thereof.

These sets

of factors, albeit incongruous or divergent are nonetheless of
importance and relevant to a recommendation on what should be
done about the wages and other monetary benefits of SEPTA
employees.

1.

See New York Times editorial MTA at the Brink, Saturday,
March 1, 1975.
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To explain further.

The transit system of greater

Philadelphia is an essential service.
interest, deficit or not.
part of that essentiality.

It must run, in the public

Perforce its employees are an integral
There is no suggestion whatsoever in

the record that SEPTA is over staffed with bargaining unit
employees.

The productivity issue is imprecise and incomplete

as to facts and evidence and I shall treat with it below and in
the recommendations that follow.

However I deem it unfair and

unwise for employees of an essential facility to be asked to work
for any extended period of time at wages or other conditions of
employment discejrnably less favorable

than what prevails in

other comparable employment relationships.

In that regard I con-

clude that "other comparable employment relationships"

encompass

both the Philadelphia labor market and transit employment in
other large northeastern cities of the United States.
significant inequity cannot for long be

Any such

justified on the grounds

that the employer lacks the funds, due to falling revenues, inadequate appropriations, or curtailed or rejected subsidies, to
pay or meet the relative competitive wage scales and other standards of employment in comparable employment relationships.

As an

essential service with essential employees I think it a default
of public responsibility and contrary to the welfare of the vast
riding public if public officials and the appropriate legislatures
fail to assist SEPTA in maintaining or improving wages and
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conditions of employment at or to standard levels.

Put another

way I think it basically unfair to impose on employees a de facto
burden of subsidizing some of the deficit through lower wages
or other less favorable benefits.
At the same time however, while employees may need and
be entitled to increased wages to meet increasing living costs,
to make up losses in earnings due to an inflationary rate beyond what was anticipated or bargained on in the last contract
round, and to satisfy a claim for normal improvement expectations,
the bleakness of the general economic picture is equally material.
Unemployment mounts at a frightening rate.

Jobs are increasingly

scarce and qualified applicants for SEPTA positions far exceed
the number of vacancies.

The grimness of the economy places a

legitmate damper on the prospect of larger public subsidies to
SEPTA; tax revenues have decreased; public budgets are being
sharply cut;

public employees face layoffs; and apparently many

types of essential governmental services are being maintained by
increased deficit financing.
property.

So a job with SEPTA is a valuable

And the contract prohibition on layoffs after one year

of service is, though the Union argues that "it has yet to cost
SEPTA anything", a highly valuable right and protection in
recessionary

times.

Additionally the Union and SEPTA should recognize that
despite deficit operations before and at the outset of the last

-17contract term, fact finder Kleeb recognized the bona fide needs
and claims of the employees for wage increases and other improvements, and recommended them.

Balancing all the equities, and

even though SEPTA's financial position is now more precarious
than before, I shall do so also.

And my recommendations on

wages may be construed as more favorable to the employees than
those recommended by Mr. Kleeb for the predecessor contract term.
What is required in my judgement is a delicate balance between the reasonable needs and expectations of the employees for
wage increases and other improvements, and the precarious
economic condition of SEPTA and the realistic constraints on its
ability and the ability of public treasuries to pay for increased labor costs.

Because, in the instant contract negotia-

tions those bona fide but divergent influences are more pronounced
than before, the balance, if not more delicate shall be different than in prior years.

For example, I consider the wage

package more compelling than specific improvements in fringe
benefits.

And though not in the predecessor contract, a cost

of living adjustment sometime during the upcoming contract term
to protect the recommended wage increases, is a concept whose
time has come.

2.

Mr. Kleeb recommended wage increases of approximately 6.5%,
370 and 3% over the two year contract term.

-18By the same token SEPTA1s claims regarding productivity
warrant careful and objective attention.

There is no dispute

that improved productivity where and when possible, if not
already achieved, can make a real contribution towards covering increased costs, and SEPTA is entitled to consideration of
its claims in that respect.

Therefore without making a

subjective judgement on the issue (because the evidence in
the record is insufficient and inconclusive) I shall include
a recommendation on SEPTA's "productivity proposal."
Considering all the foregoing the Undersigned, duly
designated as the fact finder, makes the following RECOMMENDATIONS
Contract Term
The contract term shall be two years commencing
March 15, 1975 and ending midnight March 14, 1977.
A two year contract is not simply the midpoint between the Union's demand for a one year agreement
and SEPTA's demand for a three year agreement, nor
is it simply the same length as the predecessor
agreement.

More importantly, as I see it, it rep-

resents the right amount of time to give both sides
a reasonable period of stability of employment and
services, and not bind them to terms and conditions
for too long when the economy is uncertain and unsettled.

-19Wages
a.

Wages shall be increased by 11% across

the board effective March 15, 1975.
b.

Wages shall be further increased by

4% across the board effective July 15, 1976.
c.

Wages shall be further increased by

4% across the board effective December 15, 1976.
Cost of Living Adjustment
It is recommended that there be a cost of
living adjustment made during the last quarter
of the second year of the contract based on a
one cent an hour increase for each .5 increase
in the 1967 = 100 Consumer Price Index for the
Philadelphia area, with a maximum adjustment of
12(^ an hour.
Fringe Benefits
SEPTA views the fringe issues as additional
cost items.

In my judgement some improvement in

fringe benefits is justified but that it is best
for the fact finder to recommend an amount of
money which SEPTA should commit to those improvements leaving it then to the parties to negotiate
how that sum should be applied to or allocated
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among fringe benefit proposals.

Accordingly it

is recommended that in addition to the foregoing
wage increases SEPTA commit an amount of money
equivalent to 5 cents an hour to be allocated to
fringe items as determined by negotiations between
the parties.
SEPTA Productivity Proposal
The fact finder has stated his views regarding the desirability of a workable arrangement
to review and improve, where necessary, the productivity of the work force and services. The fact
finder takes judicial notice of the productivity
arrangement between this Union and the New York
City Transit Authority, and the joint productivity
committees established thereunder.

The fact

finder recommends that the parties hereto agree
to a similar arrangement, with similar procedures
and objectives.
Other Issues Before the Fact Finder and Other Contract
Terms
The parties are presently in negotiations ,and
presumably will continue in negotiations after
rendition of these Recommendations.

The parties

-21have the right to negotiate further on the Recommendations.

Also the fact finder does not wish to foreclose

the parties from negotiating further on any other unresolved issue.

Therefore in addition to their

respective rights to negotiate on the specific Recommendations, they may upon mutual agreement to do so, negotiate
on other items submitted to the fact finder on which he
has not made specific recommendations.
Except as agreed upon or changed as a result of these
negotiations, either as a consequence of the instant Recommendations or by agreement otherwise, the provisions of the prior
agreement shall be carried over in full force and effect into
the new contract.

Eric/fLSchmertz
Fafct Finder
DATED: March 6, 1975
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " '
On this sixth day of March, 1975, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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